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SUMMARY
Although Piaget originally described the Object Concept as developing
over six stages, in recent years the development of the Object Concept
appears to have become synonymous with the eight month old infant's
failure to search appropriately for an object hidden under one of two
cloths in the Stage IV - V transition test. Much theoretical
controversy centres on whether this failure reflects the infant's
inability to represent objects that are no longer visible, his
egocentric notions of space, or limitations of his motor, memory and
information processing skills.
This thesis argues that none of the above explanations are adequate.
All are seen to suffer from a lack of consideration of what is known
about the infant's competence at earlier stages in the developmental
sequence. The pre-P month old infant can conserve the existence of
an object in other task contexts. Further practice at earlier stages
of the development of the Object Concept beneficially affects the
infant's performance in the Stage IV - V task suggesting that an
explanation of the infant's difficulties in the latter task must relats
to an explanation of all the stages in the developmental sequence.
This thesis attempts to give such an explanation, an overall
framework in which the interrelation of stages in the development of
the Object Concept can be seen. It i3 called "The identity hypothesis."
This hypothesis suggests that development through Stages I - III
of the Object Concept is development of rules of object identity -
rules that specify the sameness, the uniqueness of an object through
the various transformations it may undergo. These rules are seen to
constrain the set of spatial relations that may exist between objects.
At around eight months of age, it is argued that the infant's concept
of object identity is such that if an object shar«3 a spatial boundary
with another its individual identity ia lost. Thus 'he spatial
relationships 'inside' 'under' and 'on', are argued to be
incomprehensible to the infant. But, the former two relationships are
involved in the Stage III - Yl transition tasks. Thus it is argued
that the infant's difficulties in these tasks stem not so much from the
disappearance of the object per se, but. from the type of spatial
relationship pertaining between the object and the occluder. This
thesis offers support for this analysis by demonstrating that even if
the object, is not hidden from view, but rather placed inside a trans¬
parent container or on a platform in full view of the infant he
nevertheless makes the characteristic Stage IV - V and V - VI transition
errors. However this model of the development of the Object Concept
runs into several difficulties. Contrary to prediction, th> infant is
observed to have difficulty on the Stage 112 - V transition tasks even
if the object is hidden behind a screen, although such a spatial
relationship does not generally involve the sharing of object boundaries.
An attempt is made to incorporate this finding within the identity
hypothesis by postulating that when the distance between the object and
screen i3 small the infant does not see them as perceptibly separate




1.1. Gbe importance of tha Object Concept
The development of the Object Concept (Piaget 1937) is argued to be
the child's most significant intellectual achievement during the first
two years of life. According to Piaget this segment of development is
tha prototype of cognitive development in general and forms the basis
from which logical thought and mathematical reasoning develop.
Bell (1970) and Schaffer and Emerson (1964) share Piaget's
enthusiasm. Both view the development of the Object Concept as being
of crucial importance for the social development of the child.
Differentiated, affective attachments to specific human beings are argued
to occur at the same time as the infant begins to search in earnest for
a vanished object. Both behaviour patterns are thus viewed as a
function of the growth of the infant's ability to represent, objects -
his development of an Object Concept. Social behaviours such as stranger
fear and separation anxiety are thus explained by the growth of the
Object Concept. To be scared of a stranger is to be able to note the
discrepancy between the features of the stranger and the features of a
developed internal representation of one's mother.
Psycholinguists such as Roberts and Black (1972), Brown (197o),
Bloom (1973), Mwards (1973) have also argued that the infant's
development of an Object Concept is of great importance. The possession
of an Object Concept is viewed as being a necessary precursor to
language development. Roberts and Black (1972) and Brown (197 ) argue
that the young child would be unable to grasp the referential function
of language unless he had the concept of a stable and enduring object.
Fdwards (1973) argues for a close correspondance between the relational
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meanings that are expressed universally in the two-word speech of the
two year old child and the nature of sensor!-aotor intelligence. The
development of the Object Concept thus provides
"the structures of knowledge and meaning via which
language refers to the world The acquisition
of meaning's is characterised as a process in which
the meanings of input speech are assimilated to the
child's perception of the world and events referred
to." (P.398. COGNITION 1973 2/4).
The final accolade for the importance of the Object Concept comes
from Ulkind and Sameroff (1970) who regard it as Piaget's most
significant discovery.
It ia thus with some trepidation that I wish to propose in thi3
thesis that the problem of the development of the Object Concept has
been largely misconstrued.
1.2. THE TRADITIONAL PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM
As it ia traditionally presented, the development of the Object
Concept is regarded as the development of the child's ability to
represent objects which are no longer visible.
Piaget himself argues that the problem is more complicated than
thats-
"... from the onset .. the formation of the scheme of
the permanent object is closely related to the whole
spatial - temporal and causal organization of the
practical universe." (CONSTRUCTION OP REALITY 1937).
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This narrow interpretation of what the development of the object
concept involves can be seer, to be the result of the manner in which
Piagot investigated the child's concept of an object. Piaget basically
took the child'a reaction to the disappearance of an object as
indicative of his understanding of objects. Piaget's experimental
strategy thus bears a strong resemblance to the use of the delayed -
response task3 (CARR-HURTSR 1913)» by comparative psychologists in their
investigations of whether animals were capable of 'representing' events.
i.3. PIAGIST'S DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVEIOFMFMTAL SEQUENCE
According to Piaget the development of the Object Concept occurs
in Six Stages. These stages are distinguished and classified by
changes in the child's reaction to objects that have disappeared from
his visual field. At Stage I-II (0-2 months), Piaget argues that the
infant shows no particular behavioural response to vanished objects.
If for example, an object is held in front of the infant and then
dropped the infant will not track its displacement but will remain















At St8*9 IT-III (2-4 month*) t>m infant will follow the trajectory of
a displaced object. For example, be will track bis mother across the
roora and will continue to track even if she disappears from sight
through a door-way.
"In the realm of sight, Jacqueline, as early as 0:2
follows her mother with her eyes, and when her
mother leaves the visual field, continues to look
in the same direction until the picture re-appears."
(P.9. CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY).
Piaget however argues that such a behaviour pattern does not demonstrate
true permanence but merely reflects accoramodatory adjustments of the
infant's sense organs. Ihe infant rather than tracking an object that
has disappeared from sight is argued to be simply "pursuing the
trajectory delineated by the immediately preceding perception" (Piaget
1954)* Evidence for this statement is obtained from the fact that a
child of this age will continue to track a previously moving object
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( ) THE INFANT CONTINUES TO "TRACK THE BALL" ALTHOUGH IT IS NOW STATIONARY.
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At Stags III-IV (4-6 months) the infant according to Piaget dsmonstrates
in his behaviour the beginning of true permanence. He will now track
the displacement of an object that is dropped in front of him.
"At 0x6 he (Laurent), holds an empty match box in his
hand. When it falls his eyes search for it, even if
they have not followed the beginning of the fall} he
turns his head in order to see it on the sheet."
(P. 15. CONSTRUCTION OP REALITY").
The infant will also now stop tracking an object when it itself stops moving.
The beginnings of permanence are also seen in the infant's reaching
behaviour. At this age the infant will reach for an object that has
been partially covered (FIGURE 1j4). If however the object is totally
covered the infant will not make any attempt to uncover the object
(FIGURE 1x5)* He acts as if the object no longer exists. Neither
tactile (Gratch 1971) nor auditory input (Piaget 1937» Moore I969) appear
initially capable of compensating for the lack of visual information as
to the object's whereabouts (FIGURE 1x5b)
FIGURE
1:4




EVEN IS THE INFANT IS HOLDING THE OBJECT IN HIS OWN HAND -VEEN IT IS
COVERED HE WILL STILL NOT REMOVE THE CLOTH FOR THE OBJECT.
When the infant can recover the object from under the cloth the third
stage ends. At Stage IV-V (6-12 months) the infant appears to have a
peculiar concept of an object. The infant will look for an object if
it is hidden under a cloth in position A. However^having found the
object under the cloth at position A, the infant will continue to look
for the object under that cloth even when the object is moved to an
alternative location B and covered by another cloth (FIGURE li6).
"Jacqueline is seated on a mattress without anything
to disturb or distract her. I take the parrot from
her hands and hide it twice in succession under the
mattress on her left, in A. Both times Jacqueline
looks for the object and grasps it. Then I take it
from her hands and move it very slowly before her
eye3 to the corresponding place on her right, under
the mattress, in B. Jacqueline watches this movement
very attentively but at the moment when the parrot
disappears in B she turns to her left and looks where
it was before, in A." (P.51. 30NSTRUCTI0N OF REALITY)
This error implies that the infant does not yet really understand
that an object that has been covered by a cloth is under that cloth.
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According to Pi agett
"Such behaviour patterns seem tc show us that the object
is not yet, at this stage, a substantial thing remaining
in the place to which it was moved but a thing at
disposal in the place where the action made use of it.
.active search for the vanished object is not
immediately general but is governed by a restrictive
condition: the child looks for and conceives of the
object only in a special position, the first place in
which it was hidden and found." (P.50. CONSTRUCTION OP
RPALITY)
When the Infajrt can cope with the Stage IV-V transition task he enters
Stage V. (12-18 months). He has proved himself to be capable of
8
dealing with visible displacements of the object. His behaviour in
Stage V, however, is characterised by the fact that he cannot cope with
invisible displacements of the object. Take for example the Stage V-
VI transition task designed, independently by Arcnson (1971) and
KcOonigle (1971) th3 object is hidden under one of two opaque cloths.
The cloths are then transposed. The infant characteristically will
track the movement of the cloth + object but will look for the object





THE OBJECT IS HIDDEN
THE INFANT SEARCHES FOR THE
OBJECT ON THE SIDE iVHHRE IT
WAS PREVIOUSLY HIDDEN
Fiaget himself uses a more complicated task,^" to assess the infant's
ability to cope with invisible displacements. This task format is
illustrated in Figure 1:8. Even if the child can successfully solve
the above test format, Piaget argues that this does not provide
sufficient evidence that he understands the invisible displacement of
1. This task has been 3hown by Moore (19^9)» using a Guttman Scale
Analysis, to be more difficult for the infant than the Stage V-VI






the object is placed IN
THE experimenter'3 HAND
it is then moved
behind the screen
the infant tracks
the object is released
behind the screen
he 33 unable to infer
'
mere the object idas gone
THE infant
searches in the hand
the object. He is successful only by 'empirical groping.' Piaget's
evidence for this statement is derived from the following observation:
"I place the object in my hand, put my hand under A and
bring it out closed. Jacqueline searches in my hand,
looks at it, over and over, then looks at me with
astonishment, examines the floor and as though enlight¬
ened by her thoughts turns over the garment A. She
takes the object and laughs.
I repeat the same gestures in b. Jacqueline opens my
hand, again hesitates for a moment and then returns to A
without hesitation the reaction Is very definite with
an attitude of sustained attention." (P.75• CONSTRUCTION
OF REALITY) (FIGURE 1:9)
Only when the infant can solve this ta.ek is Piaget willing to concede
that he has a fully fledged behavioural understanding of the Object
Concept.
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When the object is then left behind the other screen although the
infant tracks its displacement he looks behind the first screen
for it.
1.
1.5. VALIDATION OF PIAGST'S DESCRIPTION
Piaget's basic description of the development of the Object
Concept from birth to eighteen months of age has been confirmed by
Gouin-Decarie (1965), Escalona and Corman (I969), llzgiris and Hunt
(1966) and in broad outline by Miller and Cohen (1970). Woodward
(19 65) has confirmed that the hierarchy of task difficulty contained
in Piaget*3 stage description does exist in retarded children. Gouin-
Decarie (1969) has also confirmed the formal similarity of the errors
the infant makes during behavioural development of the Object Concept
to those made in dealing with words that represent objects.
Comparative studies of the development of the Object Concept in
animals have also been carried out. Gruber,Girgus and Banuazzi (1971)
observed a similar sequence of development in kittens although the
sequence was completed by 20/24 weeks of age, culminating in less
complex behaviour patterns. Vaughter, Smotherman and Ordy (1972) observed
a similar developmental sequence in squirrel monkeys as did Wise, Wise
and Zimmermann with rhesus monkeys - the latter investigators concluded:
"In each testing situation was found a sequence of
development of object permanence that was very
similar to the one described by Piaget for the child
and in each case the sequence culminated in
behaviours nearly as complex as those described by
Piaget for the two year old child."
1.6. THEORETICAL CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
OBJECT CONCEPT
The accuracy of Piaget's description of the behaviour patterns
characterising the development of the Object Concept is thus not in
doubt. Theoretical controversy largely centres on his explanation of
the problem facing the infant at Stage III of the developmental sequence
and why the infant makes the particular type of error that he does in
the Stage IV-V transition tasks.
Little attantion has been paid to the evaluation of Piaget's 3tage
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model of development, and even less to his theorising on the
relationship of the development of the Object Concept on the behavioural
plane to early language development.
(1971)
Gratch/and Schaffer (1971) agree with Piaget that conservation of
an object that is no longer visible is the main problem facing the
infant in the Stage III task. Given that neither auditory (Fraiberg,
Siegel & Gibson 1966, Freedmaa, Fox-Kolenda, Margileth & Miller 1969
and Piaget 1954) nor tactile (Gretch As Landers 1971, Gratch 1972)
information appears initially capable of substituting for the lack of
visual information as to the object's whereabouts when hidden by a
cloth, Gratch and Schaffer further agree that the development of inter-
sensory co-ordination plays an important part in the growth of the
infant's ability to represent an object that is no longer visible.
Evans and Gratch (1972) have taken issue with Piaget over his
explanation of why the iafant makes the Stage IV-V transition error.
Piaget argues that having found the object twice at A, the infant on
the B trial of the AAB sequence searches for the object at A because
2. The only theorists who have attempted to provide evidence for
Piaget's stage model of development during the sensori-motor period
are Bower (1974 and Gratch and Landers (19715« Both noted that
the probability of error in the Stage IV—V transition task remained
at 0.5 until the infant could cope with tho task, an. observation
that is congruent with Piaget's stage model.
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he identifies the object in terms of his last successful action to
that location. Evans and Cratch (1972) argued that, if that was the
case, if a different object was bidden at B the infant would not
search at A. They observed that this was not the case and concluded
that A is a sort of 'toy box* to the infant. Infant3 thus were
argued to err in the Stage IV-V task because of place-responding habits.
Moore (1969) supported this analysis.
Landers (1971) and Bremnar and Bryant (1976) likewise focussed
their attention on the Stage IV-V transition error. These theorists
argued that their results demonstrated that the infant made the Stage
IV-V transition error because of response preservation rather than
place responding habit3, Landera observed that if infants were not
given active search experience of finding the object at A they made
fewer runs of errora in subsequent 3 trials. Gratch (1976) however
pointed out that those infants who did not have active search experience
of finding the object at A nevertheless male as many errors in the 1st
subsequent B trial as did infants who had. "vans and Gratch (1972)
and Evans (1973) were also unable to confirm, by replication, Landers'
original findings. Brecnner and Bryant observed that if the object
was hidden at A twice and the infant then moved to the other side of
the testing' table (FIGURE IjII)
1-
the infant would search in B for the object when it was again hidden
at A. They thus concluded that their results "support the notion
that preservation (in the AAB test) is of responses rather than places."
Bremner and Bryant's conclusion is however invalid. Their experiment
fails totally to distinguish between place in the sense of geographical
position and place coded relative to the self i.e. 'to the left or
right of me.' The infants could have searched in B because it was
the place to the left of them. No resolution of the 'place' v 'response*
preservation argument has thus yet been made. It is interesting to
observe that this controversy has long been a central problem in
comparative psychology (see Oleitman 1969)» Fe* developmental
investigations of this problem match the sophistication of the latter
studies however.
Paralleling the fact that the delayed response task used by
comparative psychologists developed into a te3t of an animal's memory
capacity rather than of his capacity for ideation, so too developmental
psychologists have argued that the Stage III Object Concept task is
really a test of the infant's memory capacity rather than his ability
to represent an object that is no longer visible. According to
Harris (1973) the infant fails the Stage III task because of a
primary memory difficulty and makes the Stage IV-V error because of
pro-active interference. A similar argument is made by Webb, Nadolny
and Massar (1972) who argue that the infant makes the Stage IV-V
error because of a conflict between visual memory of a recent event
and action based memory for a successful action. 3oth these
approaches assume that the fact that the object is
i:
no longer visible to the infant in the Stage III and IV-V task is
important. On a different tack, altogether, Yonas (Bower 1974) has
argued that the infant fails the Stage III task simply because ha
lacks the appropriate motor 3kill to remove the cup for the object.
Bower and W5.shart (1972) demolished this suggestion by showing that
infants who failed the Stage III task could nevertheless remove a
transparent cloth in order to obtain the object from underneath. They
observed however that even if the object was visible underneath the
cloth it took the infant a considerable length of time to remove the
cloth for the object. Bower and Wishart then suggested that the problem
facing the infant in the Stage III task was a memory + motor skill
problem. All of tbe above formulations"^ make the assumption,like
Piaget, that nothing very significant is happening in tbe infant's
development prior to six months of life. It could be argued that this
assumption is valid as Piaget writes that in Stage I-II of the develop¬
ment of the Object Concept the infant shows no particular behaviour
towards vanished objects. Unfortunately;however.Piaget paid little
attention to the need for careful psychophysical control of disappearance
sequences. He presumed that a disappearance was a disappearance and
neglected the point that different types of disappearance sequences
involved different types of optical information. He likewise ignored
other variables such as the speed at which the object was made to
disappear. Perhaps however such factors are unimportant, perhaps they
do not constrain the infant's behaviour in any way. Hecent research
indicates that such factors are important.
If the Infant up until the end of Stage III simply believed that
3. Except Bower and Wishart's work viewed in a historical light.
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objects cea3ed to exist when they disappeared from sight then it would
not matter what type of response an investigator used to assess their
belief. Ifon permanence behaviour would he obtained regardless of
whether heart-rate, eye movements, operant responses, or reaching
behaviour were used. Bower (1967) however has observed that infants
as young as 7 weeks of age appeared to expect an object to continue
to exist if occluded by a screen if their heart-rate or operant
sucking responses were observed. Further this demonstration of
permaren ce hehavicur was dependent on
&) the rate at which the object was occluded
b) the time during which the object is occluded-
Likewise Bower (19^7) demonstrated that infants as young as 6 weeks of
age appeared to work with the Costalt rule of good continuation. In
this study the infants were conditioned to respond to a black wire
triangle with a bar ever it. ?hey were then presented with, four
different wire triangles (Figure Is 12). All the infants were observed
to make the greatest number of conditioned responses to the first of
the four triangles. Such a result- can be taken as evidence that the
infants perceived the original display as a triangle with a bar over
it. In other words they understood that the part3 of the triangle





IHirther Bower, Brc«ghton and Moore (1971) demonstrated that infants as
young as 4 months of age cm represent the path of objects that have
disappeared behind a screen, even when the path must be inferred and
cannot be tracked by continuing an ongoing movement* Kundy - Castle
and Anglin (1969) have confirmed this observation. They used the
experimental set-up demonstrated in Figure 1:13.
Figure 1:13
The infant observed an object appear in the left-hand porthole, travel
up the porthole to disappear than reappear at position (3) and travel
down to disappear again. Infants of 16 weeks of age were observed
to interpolate a curvilinear trajectory between object position (2)
and object position (3). The height of this trajectory was proportional
to the difference between time of disappearance and time of reappearance
of the object. The infants thus seemed capable of inferring the path
the object must have taken to move from position (2) to position (3)
within a given time interval of X seconds. Further if the grasping
behaviour of a 4 to 5 month old infant is observed it is seen that the
infant manifests representation of invisible surfaces. As Bower (1976)
writes
4
"Differential hand shaping is quite well developed
in such infants, and would not be possible without
some mechanism for inferring information about the
invisible side of an object." (P.42. in 'INFANT
PERCEPTION! From Sensation to Cognition.'
Cohen & Salapatek). (Figure 1:14)
Figure 1:14.
The infant thus prior to 6 months of age demonstrates a considerable
degree of competence in dealing with disappearance sequences.
Let us now consider the arguments of Cratch and Schaffer that the
development of inter-sensory co-ordination is an important factor in
the development of the Object Concept. The assumption here is that
the infant prior to 6 months of age lacks such a co-ordination of his
senses. This assumption is invalidated by the work of several
researchers who have demonstrated auditory - visual co-ordination at
birth (Wertheimer 1961, Aronson & Rosenbloom 1971)> visual-tactile
co-ordination at 7 weeks of age (Bower, Broughton & Moore 1970) and
auditory-manual co-ordination by at least 16 weeks of age (Bower &
Wishart) (unpublished manuscript). The infants in the latter study
were observed to be totally unable to remove a cloth to obtain an
audible object from underneath despite being- able to reach for an
audible object in the dark. Further all the above co-ordinations
are observed to decline as the infant gains in his competence in
dealing with the Object Concept tasks (Bower 1974).
Lack of inter-sensory co-ordination does not thus appear a
satisfactory explanation of the six month old infant's failure in the
Stage III task. Is the memory explanation offered by Harris any
/
better? Bower (1974) argues no. To quote
•This hypothesis is attractively simple; however
common observation — rather than systematic
experimentation - would suggest that it is probably
wrong. The memory span of the 5 to 6 month old
infant is much greater than five minutes. Infants
brought into the laboratory at this age otfften reveal
that they remember what happened on a previous visit
a day or more ago .... Infants who have previously
been fooled in the virtual - object situation will
not reach again for virtual objects in this situation.'
(P.205: DEVELOPMENT IN INFANCY 1974)A
Secondly Harris' statement of the memory difficulty that the
infant experiences in the Stage III task presumes memory to be a black
box, a process or product separable from the perceptual and cognitive
abilities of the organism. Recent research by Corsini 1971» Flavell
1971, Jenkins 1971, Sykes 1976, indicates that memory is not such a
black box. Rather, what the organism can recall reflects the
developmental state of his perceptual and cognitive capabilities
(Eassaro 1970, Craik & Lockhart 1972).
1.7. A QUESTION OF REPETITION IN DEVELOPMENT
In an attempt to reconcile the competence shown by the pre-6
month old infant with the incompetence demonstrated in the Stage III-
IV, IV—V Object Concept tasks (6 to 12 months of age) the notion of
2 i
repetition in development has been evoked.
Schaffer (1971) has pointed out that the infant's understanding
of the disappearance of an object ha3 generally been assessed by
using eye movements prior to 6 months of age (Bower, Broughton and
Moore 1971» Mundy-Castle and Anglin 1969). After 6 months of age in
the Stage III-IV, IV-V, Object Concept tasks the infant's understanding
is assessed by using reaching behaviour. Accordingly, Schaffer
appears to suggest that the infant has a "schizoid" mind in which
information available to control eye movements is not available to
control.reaching behaviour at six months of age. This argument is
plausible in so far as the errors the infant makes in tracking the
disappearance of an object prior to six months of age are formally
very similar to the errors he makes in the Stage IV-V transition task
at nine months of age. As Piaget reports, prior to 6 months of age
(Stage II-IIl) the infant will look for an object where it was last
seen ignoring its current displacements. Bower, Broughton and Moore
(1971) have also observed such behaviour. After several trials of
watching an object move from A to B (Figure 1:15) the infant would,
when the object moved to C, look for it at B.
After several trials of
observing the object move
from A to B the infant is
given a trial in which the
object moves to C. He
responds to this A-C dis¬
placement by looking for the





At 9 months of age in the Stage IV-V transition task the infant will
search for the object in the place where it was last found ignoring
its current displacement (FIGURE Is 16)
FIGURE
1:16
Two findings question Schaffer's argument. Bower and Wishart (1972)^
observed that infants who fail the standard Stage III Object Concept
task would nevertheless reach for an object in the dark. The infants
were placed in a lighted room and presented with an object dangling
in free space. Before the infants were able to reach for the object
the room was plunged into darkness. Respite the object now being
out of sight all of the infants reached out and grabbed it (FIGURE
1:17). In their reaching behaviour all of the infants conserved the




Secondly Bower and Paterson (1972) observed that training on tracking
tasks prior to 6 months of age accelerated the rate at which infants
passed through the Stage III-IV, IV-V Object Concept tasks. Such
transfer of learning poses problems for Sch affer's repetition hypothesis.
It is difficult to see what the basis of transfer could be between two
motor systems as diverse as the hand and the eye.
This alternative explanation of the infant's failure in the Stage
III-1V, IV-V Object Concept tasks would thus also appear to be un¬
satisfactory.
1.8. A POSSIBLE REFORMULATION OF 7H\T THE PROBLEM IS: THE IDENTITY
HYPOTHESIS
The question now becomes what explanation can be given of the. six
month old infant's failure to cope with the Stage III-TV, IV-V Object
Concept tasks that is compatible with what we know about the infant's
competence prior to six months of age? I believe that an explanation
2
can be given, or at least constructively sought, if investigators stop
viewing the development of the object concept as involving primarily
the growth of the infant's ability to conserve the existence of an
object when it is out of sight. There is no such thing as a unitary
concept of existence constancy. As Michotte (1962) has clearly
demonstrated,the manner in which an object disappears from sight is of
crucial importance in determining the adult's response. A transform¬
ation such as that described in Figure 1:18a is seen by the adult as
specifying that the object is moving out of sight but continuing to
exist. A transformation such as that described in FIGURE 1:18b is not
seen by the adult as specifying the contirtted existence of an object











(A) An object going out of sight but continuing to exist
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ichotte has specified in some detail the stimulus conditions necessary
for the adult to conserve the existence of an object that is no longer
visible. His results are summarized in FIGURE 1119• Only those
stimulus conditions defined by the left hand branches of the tree
lead to existence constancy.
The meaning of the dichotomies ia fairly clear. An abrupt disappearance
is one in which there are no detectable intermediaries between appearance
and disappearance. Such is the case when an object explodes. 4 local
non-perspectival transformation occurs when an object fades away*
dissolves or dissipates. These disappearance sequences lead to non
conservation of the existence of the object. By contrast whole field
transformation and gradual local perspectival transformations lead to
conservation responses. The former occurs when the lights of a room
are switched off, the latter when a person leaves a room.
hat then is the relevence of Michotte's work on existence
constancy with adults for theorising on the development of the Object
Concept in young infants? Through a consideration of vichotte*s work
Gibson et al (1969) have suggested that the development of the Object
Concept does not involve the construction of the existence of an object
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by conceptual processes but rather involves processes of perceptual
differentiation whereby the infant learns to decipher one type of
optical information specifying- the continued existence of the object
from another type which does not specify this. Bower (1967) has
however questioned Gibson's theory. Bower replicated Michotte's
work with very young infants, on average 3 weeks of age. He observed
that
"there is remarkably little difference between
infant and adult as far as psychophysical control
(of response to disappearance sequences) is
concerned." (Perception and Psychophysics 1967)
Infants, as indicated by their heart-rate, sucking and operant
responses, all conserved the existence of an object in those situations
where the optical information available corresponded to that indicated
in the left hand branch of Michotte's tree diagram. The only
difference between the infants in Bower's study and the adults in
Michotte's study was in the rate at which the infant could process the
optical information and in his ability to store such information in
memory.
Such results would appear to suggest that there is no such thing
as a development of an Object Concept. The changes in the infant's
responses to disappearance sequences as described by Piaget could be
argued to merely reflect changes in the infant's processing capacities.
Certainly, if an object in Bower's study was moved behind the screen
too quickly, this gradual local perspective transformation was changed
into an abrupt transformation in the infant's eyes and led to a non
conservation response. Likewise change in the infant's ability to
track an object that is dropped in front of him could be argued to
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reflect change in his rate of processing information. As Bower writes
"If one follows the development of the Object
Concept in field situations, it is not obvious
that anything is incrementing other than search
skill, processing rate and trace duration."
4
rascual-Leone makes a similar suggestion. He points out that each
stage in the development of the Object Concept is characterised by an
increase in the amount of information the infant has to handle (FIGURE
1:19b). The orderliness of the infant's progression through this
developmental sequence is seen to reflect changes in the infant's
processing capacity, motor skills and memory capacity. There is no
conceptual development taking place. The infant is merely becoming





(same competence as the
adult)
Constraints on reaction
(1) speed of occlusion
(2) duration of occlusion
Stage III-IV Perceptual Analysis same as above but also (1)
motor skill and (2) greater
demand on memory capacities
due to (l)
Stage IV-V Perceptual Analysis same as Stage III-IV but
also now has to consider two
containers in the visual field
Stage V-VI 'erceptual Analysis same as Stage IV—V but also
has to consider movement of
the containers.
Such an analysis of the infant's behaviour in the Object Concept tests
is supported by Lutterworth (pers comm) in theory and by the work of
4. Personal Communication about his work from Dr. J.S. Vatson, Stanford
University.
Harris (1973) which demonstrated that how long the object was occluded
for affected the infant's behaviour in the Stage IV - V task. Likewise
the limited information processing capacities of infants during this
developmental sequence has been demonstrated in studies outwith the
framework of the Object Concept:-
Ahrens (1954) study of the smiling response
Bower (1966b) study of Heterogenous Summation
Salapatek (1966) study of pattern perception and
Bower and Dunkeld's (1973) study of the visual exploration of
objects by infants.
However is this approach capable of accounting for all the
evidence that has been gathered in respect of the development of the
Object Concept? Certainly Pascual'Leone's model can in principle
account for differences in the infant's reactions to disappearance
sequences as indicated by his eye movements as opposed to his reaching
behaviour as the latter task situations involve a greater demand on his
information processing capacities.
However, while processing limitations are bound to play a part in
the development of the Object Concept, they do not appear capable of
totally explaining this development. Processing; capacities, memory
capacities and motor skill all change over time. The 12 month old
infant's abjlities in this respect are very different from that of the
6 month old. Both are as likely to make the Stage IV - V transition
error. A theorist committed to a "processing capacity" model of the
development of +he Object Concept could explain this apparently
anomalous fact by arguing that although the processing capacity of the
12 month old was greater than that of the 6 month old it still was not
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sufficient to meet the demands of the Stage IV - V task. He would
then however have difficulty in accounting for the results of Bower
and Paterson's (1972) study in which practice at Stage II - III of
the developmental sequence was shown to accelerate development through
the latter stages of the Object Concept. While it is possible to
suggest that such early experience increased the information
processing capacities of the young infant, such a reply would be
insufficient. It cannot deal with the selective nature of the type
of Stage II - III experience that was required for acceleration.
Practice in tracking ^asks that did not involve the object stopping
every so often, had no effect on Stage III - VI development. Such
tasks could however be argued to equally exercise and extend the
infant's processing capacities.
Secondly such an approach is incapable of explaining the fact
that the infant's performance in the Stage II - III and IV - V
transition tasks remains at chance until the infant succeeds for good
(Bower and Paterson 1972, Gratch and Landers 1971)• Gn a processing
limitations model, performance in a given transition task would be
expected to gradually stabilise over time as processing capacity and
familiarity with the task increased.
Thirdly this approach neglects one other very important aspect
of Michotte's work. "ichotte demonstrated, that it was not solely the
available optical information about the object's transition to out of
sight that determined the conservation response in the adult. The
adult's response to the disappearance of an object was also
constrained by his appreciation of the type of object that was
undergoing the transformation, by the way in which he identified the
object. Anyone who has ever observed a conjurer at work can easily
appreciate how knowledge about an object, description of its
properties constrains one's response to its disappearance. Michotte's
work therefore implies a close relation between the infant's ability
to cope with a given disappearance sequence and the way in which he
identifies an object.
This implication of "ichotte's work I wish to argue holds the
key to the understanding of what the development of the Object Concept
is all about. It suggests a totally different way of viewing this
developmental sequence.
Consider what we know of the way in which the infant identifies
an object prior to 6 months of age. Bower (I97'l) has argued that
the infant initially defines an object as a "bounded volume of space."
The infant will not reach for objects if they are not defined
parallactically nor will he if the object does not have well specified
fore and aft boundaries (Bower 1966)^ Secondly the infant appears
to identify an object in terms of its path of movement in space or its
position. Although the infant can pick up featural information about
an object (Bower 1974)^ he does not initially use that information
in defining the latter. The 12 to 16 week old infant's definition
of object identity would thus appear to be
Rule I. An object is a bounded volume of space in a particular
location. As corollary the infant would appear to have the
rule.
Rule lb. Two objects cannot occupy the same position in space. All
objects seen in the same position are the same object.
Rule II. An object is a bounded volume of space which when moving along
particular path of movement is defined in terms of that
trajectory.
Rule lib. Two objects cannot occupy the same path of movement in space.
All objects on the same path of movement are the same object.
^idence for the above rules comes from a series of experiments
reported by Bower (1974)« ?or example
Evidence for Rule I. If an object is replaced by another, the latter
retaining the same spatial position as the former, the infant will not
search for the original object although the eye movements required are
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(2) If an object is displaced in space the infant will look back
to where the object was as if searching for the object although it i3
fully visible in a new spatial position (FIGURE l:2l).
FIGURE 1:21.
Evidence for Rule Two
(l) If one transforms an object in motion the young infant will
continue to track the object, seemingly accepting it as the same
object. If by contrast the motion track of the object is changed the
infant will look back and forth between the new and the old trajectory
as if searching for an object other than the one which is currently
visible (FIGURE 1:22).
FIGURE 1:22.
o —$> 0-s> O
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By the time the infant is 20 weeks of age Bower argues that he has
co-ordinated his place and movement rules of object identity by means
of progressively using featural information about the object. At 20
weeks then according to Bower the infant operates with a very adult¬
like rule of object identity.
Rule III a An object is a bounded volume of space of a particular
size, shape and colour which can go from place to place along a path
of movement." (Bower 1974)^ As corollaries
Rule IIIb: Two objects cannot occupy the same spatial position at
same tirna.
"hale IIIc: Two objects cannot occupy the same path of movement in
space at the same time.
If we accept Bower's scheme, consider what these rules of object
identity must mean for how the infant construes the Stage III-V1
Object Concept tasks.
Stage III-IV transition task; In this task the infant is shown an object
in place A. A cup or cloth is then introduced and the object is
covered. The cup and the object now occupy the same position in space
at the same time. further all the boundaries of the object are
enclosed within that of the cup. Such an occurrence is however a
violation of Rule Illb. The infant must thus see the Stage II1-1V
transition task as involving the mysterious replacement of object X by
object Y (the cup) with no information as to the object's whereabouts.
The object, from the infant's point of view has been effectively
annihi 1ated.
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With experience in this test situation the infant may be considered,
through his own actions or that of the experimenter, to be provided
wi'h information that conflicts with his initial judgement that the
object has been annihilated. Often in the Stage 1II-1V task infants
will pick up the cup for its own sake. Alternatively they will knock
it over in their distress at the object's mysterious disappearance.
From such actions, the object is revealed. If the infant also uses
featural information in his criteria of object identity as Eower suggests,
he, from such actions, i3 provided with information that the object he
thought, to be annihilated continues to exist. The problem for the
infant is then - "If the object (x) continues to exist somewhere when
it is replaced by T, how can it be recovered?" The infant could learn
from such accidents as described above, that the object may be recovered
if the replacement object is contacted. He could formulate a rule
of the form "To retrieve original object, contact and remove replacement
object." There is however no causality in such a rule, no comprehension
of the nature of the spatial relation that pertains between the object
and the cup. Such a rule, would however, be a sufficient basis for
the infant to succeed in the Stage I3T-IV transition task.
Stage TV-V transition task: the failure of the infant who successfully
copes with the Stage Ill-TV task to cope with this task support.3 the
argument that the infant's success in the former situation only reflects
pseudo-understanding of the relationship of the object to the cup.
Traditionally in the IV-V transition task two identical cups or
cloths are used. The object, defined by the infant in terms of its
size, shape, colour and position is hidden under a container, A.
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likewise defined. Faced with the mysterious disappearance of the
object, the infant puts into play his rule "Contact replacement object
to retrieve original object." The infant picks up container A and
his magical rule is reinforced by being seen to work. This sequence
occurs twice, the rule proves successful twice. The object is then
moved to a different position on the table-top and is covered by
container 3. The object is seen to be replaced by yet another object.
The child applies his rule "Contact replacement object to retrieve
original object." This rule however is not specific enough for the
task in hand. ^wo objects in the infant's visual field may be
considered as replacement objects, container A and container B. As
container A is identical in features to container B, it may be suggested
that the infant's choice between them is based on the other aspect of
their identity - their respective positions. Container A's position
could be valued by the infant a3 contact, with that container had
previously led to the successful recovery of the object. Further
looking for an object where it was last found is liable to be a
search strategy that the infant would use in everyday life when he is
faced with a situation in which he had no perceptual informa+ion as to
an object's whereabouts: for example in the case where an object was
moved when the infant had turned away from it. "Tie appropriateness of
container A as the infant's choice is however questioned by the fact
that the infant has observed the object that he is searching for to
have moved from the area of container A to that of container B.
Container B thus competes for the role of replacement object.
This analysis would suggest that in the catch trial of the AAB
Stage IV—V transition task, the infant is in a conflict between two
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possible search strategies, neither of which reflect understanding of
the relation of the object to the cup. This conflict is reflected in
the fact that the infant's success in the Stage Iv'-V transition task
remains at chance until the conflict is resolved. Success in the
Stage IV-V task could be argued to occur through the infant generating
a rule of the type "Contact replacement object in the area in which the
object was last seen." This rule could be considered to be an advance
over the Stage IIT-IV rule as now the object's last position is
related to the choice of replacement object. Such a solution to the
Stage IV-V task does not however involve a true understanding of the
relation of the cup to the object. That this is the case, can be seen
from an analysis of the infant's behaviour in the Stage V-VJ transition
t ask.
Stage V-VI transition task; In this task the infant is shown an object
in place A. A cup or cloth then covers the object. Again we have
violation of Rule TITb of the infant's set of rules of object identity.
However, in this task situation the object + cup is then moved to a
different spatial position. Such an occurrence also violates Rule
IJIc of the infant's set of object identity rules, namely that
"Two objects cannot occupy the same path
of movement at the same time."
The understanding of the relation of the cup to the object that
the infant has developed through Stage IV-V testing may be shown to be
totally inappropriate to this task situation. Application of the
rule "Contact replacement object in the area in which the object was
last seen in order to retrieve the latter" in this task situation leads
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the infant to remove the wrong container for the object. \gain, in
this task situation the removal of correct container by the experimenter,
or its accidental removal by the infant will reveal the object. \gain
the infant recognises the object as being the one which mysteriously
disappeared. It has, however, changed its position from where it was
last seen. But, according to the infant's rules of object identity
the only way an object can change its osition is by movement. In
this task situation, the only movement the infant has observed is that
of container \. Container 4 was however the replacement object that
was originally in the area where the object was last seen. Its position
and movement specifies that of the object. Thus if the infant puts
these pieces of information together the rela+ion of the cup to the
object may be finally deduced.
Consideration of the rules of object identity that operate at 20
weeks of age thus lead to an alternative explanation of the infant's
difficulty in the Stage Ill-VJ Object Concept tasks. hile it is true
that these tasks involve the disappearance of an object, the above
analysis suggests that it is not disappearance per se that causes
difficulty for the infant but rather the manner in which the object is
made to disappear. The relation object to occluder in these tasks
involves the spatial relations 'inside' or 'under'. Such relations
are argued to be incomprehensible to the infant as they involve the
sharing of object boundaries and spatial position. development through
Stages III-VI of the Object Concept is thus suggssiAd to be the
development of the infant's understanding of the spatial rela+ions
'inside' or 'under'.
31
Ouch relations are argued to be incomprehensible to the infant as they
involve the sharing of object boundaries and spatial position.
svalopcaent through Stages III-VI of the -bjoct Concept is thus
suggested to be the development of the infant's understand!ng of the
spatial relations 'inside' or 'under'.
The above argument thus appears in principle to account for the
infant's behaviour in th ■ Stage JII-vi tasks. Does it however have
any advantages over alternative theoretical frameworks?
ost investigations of the development of the nbject Concept have
been predominantly concerned with explanations of the type of error
the infant makes in the Stage IV—V transition task. They thus have
focussed on a very small part of the total developmental sequence.
By contrast, the proposed explanation of the infant's difficulty in
the Stage II3-VI transition tasks offers a framework through which the
various stages in the developmental sequence may be seen as related to
each other. It splits the development of the Object "oncept into two
ajor parts. Part 1, the ."tags I-III tasks is argued to be prisnarly
about the development of a conceptual understanding of an individual
Eject's identity. "hiring this phase of development the infant is
seen to struggle to co-ordinate his place and movement rules of object
identity thrcu h the use of featural information about, the object.
"hart II, development through "• tages I1I-YI, is seen to be the develop¬
ment of the infant's understanding cf spatial relationships between
objects that involve the sharing of object boundaries. Progress
through ftages J- .11 is however « necessary precursor of development
through .'tages III-VI. Only when an object is defined in terms of
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its spatial position + path of movement + features can the occlusion
of the object by a cup or a cloth be seen as an instantaneous replacement
of the former by the latter. Prior to such a development, the object's
occlusion by the cup would only be seen as a transformation of the
former and therefore no problem of the spatial relationship between
the object and the cup would exist. Further, utilisation of featur&l
information about object identity, which is seen as an essential
accomplishment of Stage 3-III development, is seen to be th<* crucial
basis from which the infant's development of an understanding -f the
sontial relationships involved in the ' + age 33I-VT tasks evolves.
Secondly, the argument that the development of the 'bjeot, oncept
is primarly about the infant's conception of object identity has the
following advantage over the traditional interpretation of the
developmental sequence. a long as the infant's major difficulty in
the >ta#e III-VJ tasks is viewed as being one of conserving the
existence of an object that is no longer visible, the relation between
his incompetence in these tasks and his competence in handling various
disappearance sequences prior to twenty weeka of age ia incomprehensible.
Ihowever, the major source of difficulty in the Stage 1:1-1 tasks
is argued to be the type of spatial relationship that exists between
the object and the occluder, disappearance sequences in which the object
is not occluded by mother object by being placed 'inside' or 'under'
the latter should not provide the infant with such difficulty. Now,
all of the disappearance sequences utilised in testin pre-twenty week
old infants which involved an object helm occluded by mother object
(rather than progressive transformation of the object itself)do r'r,f
involve an object going 'inside' or 'under' another object. ill these
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sequences involve an object being occluded behind a screen (Bower 1967,
Kursdy-Castle & Anglin 1969* Bower, broughton & Moore 1971). The
spatial relation 'behind' does not involve the sharing of object
b undaries such a relationship between objects does not violate the
infant's rules of object Identity. Further the optical information
specifying X going behind v and continuing to exist would appear to
be innately transduced by the infant's perceptual system.^ ven the
optical Information available during "fago IT7-VI testing may be
considered ambiguous. The cup or cloth in this situation generally
covers the object by being moved from behind the latter. 7s its front
edge comes over the object the object is behind that edge while being
also ir. front of the back surface of the cup!
In sum the infant is argued to succeed with the disappearance
sequences used in Bower et al's and undy—Castle and Inglin's studies
and fail in the ones used in Stage I3J-V2 testiru. because the former
sequences involve the spatial relationship 'behind' between the olgeete
whilst the latter sequences involve the spatial relationships 'inside'
or 'under'. hat is crucial in determining the infant's reaction to
the occlusion of the object in the Stage 1II-JV tasks is not the fact of
5. On theoretical grounds lower has argued that this must be the case
if the infant is to see three dimensional space. '!© argues that
interpretation of occlusion information is essential in order that
the infant can disambiguate information about the spatial layout
of the world that is produced by motion parallax; and expansion
pattern information (see also Cibson 19^9)» Bower (1976)•
iiarria, C&sael and Bamborougb (1974) have demonstrated the
importance of occlusion information in the world of young infante.
The tracking behaviour of infants as old as twenty weeks of age
was observed to be greatly disturbed if the movin object did not
progressively occlude then uncover a background.
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disappearance per se but the nature of the transition 'in sight' to
'out of sight'.
Thirdly this alternative explanation of the development of the
Object Concept has the advantage that it avoids the necessity of
postulating repetition in the developmental sequence. The disjunction
in the infant's competence in dealing with the occlusion of an object
by another object when eye movements are involved (Bower et al 1971»
Mundy-Castle and A.nglin 19&9) as opposed to when reaching movements
are involved as in Stage I1I-VI tasks, is explicable, as indicated above,
in terms of the different spatial relationships existing between the
objects in each ca3e.
Finally it is a framework into which other theories of the
development of the Objtfct Concept can potentially be integrated. The
information processing, the motor skill and the memory limitations of
the infant during this development are no doubt, important. It is
probable that such limitations contribute in some way to the
characteristic errors the infant makes at each stage of the developmental
sequence. In fact change in such capacities over time is likely to
be the major reason why no one set of response strategies has ever been
found to be capable of explaining the type of error made by the infant
in the Stage IV-V transition task. Such limitations come into play
however against the background of the two main conceptual problems
that face the infant in the development of the °bject Concept; the
construction of rules of object identity and the understanding of the
spatial relationships that can exist between objects. This thesis
seeks primarily for evidence in support of these conceptual problems.
It does not however deny the eventual need to consider in greater detail
how processing limitations etc. relate to such problems.
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Summary
In sum then this thesis argues that the reason the infant experiences
difficulty in the Stage III-VI Object Concept tasks i3 to be found in
the rules of object identity that the Infant operates with at- this
age. These rules specify the conditions under which an object retains
its individuality. They thus constrain the set of spatial relation¬
ships an object may enter into with another object without losing its
identity. Spatial relationships which violate these rules of object
identity by involving the sharing of object boundaries and spatial
position are thus incomprehensible to the infant. Such relationships
are involved in the nature of the transition of the object from in sight
to out of sight in the Stage III-VI tasks. This thesis thus suggests
that the major problem facing the infant in the Stage 113-VI tasks is
that of understanding the relationships between object and occluder.
The fact that the object disappears from sight in these tasks may at
best be considered a minor problem for the infant, at worse a totally
irrelevant aspect of the situation.
CHAPTER II
EVIDENCE FOR THE IDENTITY HYPOTHESIS
2.1. Prediction I
If it is difficulty in understanding the spatial relation inside
that is primarily responsible for the infant's failure to cope with
the Stage I1J-VI Object Concept tasks, then simply placing one object
inside another, even if this did not result in the disappearance of
the former object, should elicit the same sequence of errors as occur
with disappearance transitions involving the spatial relation inside.
This prediction, however would already appear to be invalidated.
Bower and Paterson (1972) gave sixteen infants the Stage III-IV Object
Concept task using both transparent and opaque containers. Ten out
of sixteen infants removed the transparent container to obtain the
object while only two out of sixteen did so for the opaque container.
From this data Bower concluded that
".. the transparent container did pose problems but
not enough to account for the difficulties with the
opaque occluder."
The problems that the transparent containers produced Bower argued,
reflected the difficulty the infant had in organising his reaching
behaviour.
"The latency of picking up the transparent occluder
when there was a toy inside was far greater than
the latency to pick up the occluder alone, indicating
that the cojoined response was far more difficult."
(see TABLE 2:1) COGNITION, I, No.2.
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TABLTS 2:1 (Bower & Paterson 1972)
N picked Mean time
Condition up to pick up N picked
occluder occluder up toy
Mean time N within
to pick free capture
up toy time
Opaque I 0 0
Transparent 14 115 sec 10 40 8
Opaque II 2 125 sec 2 35 2
Mean free capture tine for object = 45 sec
Mean free capture time for occluder = 55 sec
It is possible however that Bower's explanation of the infant's
difficulty with the transparent container is wrong. The latency
effect could reflect conceptual difficulty with the spatial relation
inside. If this is the case then infants of the same age should
exhibit the same pattern of errors in Stage 1V-V, V-VI testing with
transparent containers as they do with opaque. Alternatively if it
was motor difficulty alone that was responsible for the latency effect
in Bower & Paterson's study, the infant should make no errors in
Stage IV-V, V-VI Object Concept tests.
Experiment one evaluates these alternative hypotheses.
2.2. EXPERIMENT 1
Subjects: Seven infants, average age 27 weeks 4 days, naive to
the Object Concept tasks, served as subjects.
Materials: A variety of small brightly coloured objects were
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used of average size 3 cms x 1.5 cms. The covering agents were
transparent containers 4h cms x 3 cms diameter. These containers had
been proved to be easily manipulable by infants of six months of age
in a pilot study.
Procedure: the infant sat on his mother's knee at a table.
The experiraentor sat opposite. The infants were allowed a few
minutes to play with the toys and the containers. This was done to
discover the most favoured toy and to check that each Infant had the
requisite motor skill to manipulate the transparent containers.
After this preliminary period the favoured toy was placed alone in
front of the infant and slowly covered by the transparent container.
During the process of covering the mother prevented the infant from
reaching by gently holding him under the arm-pits. If the infant
succeeded in removing the transparent cup within the time limits
described by Bower and'Wishart (1972) the test was repeated. If the
infant was again successful the Stage IV-V transition test was given
using two transparent containers. The test was given three times
making a total of 9 trials. The side chosen for the initial covering
of the object was randomised between tests. If the infant was
successful in all three test presentations the Stage V-VI transition
test was given. Again three presentations were made. Success was
defined as 3/3 correct responses.
After this session the infants were 3een weekly.
Testing began with the highest test the infant had passed the
previous week. The criteria for passing the Stage IV-V and V-VI
transition tests were adjusted upwards so that 6/6 correct responses
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to each test was required before the infant was deemed to have passed
the test. Weekly testing was continued for 6 weeks or until the
infant could pass the V-VI transition test. At the last testing
session with transparent cups all of the babies, save one who was
sick, were run through the tests with opaque cups. Testing was
limited to a 6 week period due to the onset of school holidays.
Analysis
Stage II Test - the infant was said to have passed this test if
he could remove the transparent cup for the object within the time
limits described by Bower + Wishart (1972)•
Stage IV-V test
A correct response was the search and retrieval of the object at
all positions during AAB testing. An error was searching for the
object at A after it had been hidden at B. A response in which the
infant looked to the wrong container and semi-extended his arm to pick
it up on the catch trial before picking up the correct container for
the object was scored as a 'don't know' response. This response was
then classified as Pass or Pail depending on the proportion of pass or
fail responses in a given session.
Stage V-VI test
A similar analysis was employed. Trials in which the infant
failed to watch the complete transposition of the object were
discounted.
In all cases trials in which the infant picked up the transparent
■}6
container and ignored the object, making no attempt to reach for it
within 10 seconds, were discounted •
TABLE 2:2 Results of the longitudinal study of ability to cope
with transparent cups
Age at onset Ago attainment Age attainment
Subject wks dys Stage V Stage VI
A 21.4 24.4 n.a.
B 22.5 n.a. tl • cl •
C 27.6 30.3 30.3
D 28.2 31.6 31.6
15 29.1 32.0 n.a.
F 30.0 32.1 33.1
0 30.2 33.0 35.0
n.a. : not attained
TABLE 2:3 Comparison of performance in object pe rmanence tests
done with opaque and transparent cups in Experiment I
Stage with transparent cups
Stage
III IV V VI
with III 1





The results support the hypothesis that the •inside1 relation
plays an important part in determining the infant's difficulty with
the Stage III-VI Object Concept tasks. The results are not
predictable from Bower and Wishart's arguments, nor do they support any
'memory1 explanation of the infant's difficulty in the Stage III-VI
Object Concept tasks.
Table 2:3 however suggests that the disappearance of the object in
the traditional Stage III-VI tasks does still partially determine the
infant's response. Performance in the Stage III-VI Object Concept
tasks was poorer when opaque rather than transparent containers were used.
The infants in 'experiment One passed the Stage IV-V and V-VI tasks at a







































The infants' performance with transparent containers would thus appear
to be superior to that with opaque.
However this conclusionci.ioes not necessarily follow from the data.
In this study it is theoretically possible for the infants to have
passed the transparent container tests by developing a contingent rule
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of the type.
"To obtain an object with features X, Y, Z that has mysteriously
'disappeared' pick up the replacement object which shares these
features."x This rule demands no comprehension of the spatial
relationship existing between the object and the container but would
be sufficient for success with transparent containers. It is an
insufficient basis for the solution of the traditional Stage IV-V and
V-VI transition tasks in which identical opaque containers are used.
In these tasks there is no featural information available on which the
infant could base his choice of replacement object. The infant could
have developed a rule of the above type during longitudinal testing by
correlating success in obtaining the object with a choice of the
replacement container which was indexed by featural information that
was common to the objec4 . Figure 2x1 illustrates one type of behaviour
pattern that was observed during Experiment I and which can be taken
to indicate the infant beginning to base his choice of replacement object
on the availability of featural information.
Infant observes the
hiding of the object
at B in an AAB sequence.
The reach is arrested
as the infant is about
to make the lb error. correctly removes
cup B for the object
1. That the infant is capable of using featural information about Object
Identity at this age has veen shown; Le Compte Oratch (l 7lJl Bower
(1974).
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If the infant's success in the Stage IV-V tasks was based on them
chosing the container which shared featural information with the
sought-after object, then implementation of this strategy in the
Stage V-VI task would lead to practically instantaneous success in
the latter. Examination of Table 2:? and Table 2:4 shows this to be
the case. Of the six infants who participated in the Stage V-VI
task, four had solved the latter within the space of three testing
sessions.
Such results suggest that the infant's success in Experiment I
was a function of contingent rule formation.
Further support for this argument is to be found in the work
of Brunskill (1971)* In this study featural information was also
available to cue the infant's search in the Stage IV-V, V-VI tasks.
Instead of using two identical containers trunskill used a pair of
containers which differed in their colour, one being' plain white,
the other red. ngain, as in Experiment 1, the infants in his study
quickly solved the Stage 1"-V tasks. Further, success in the
Stage V-VI tasks was almost instantaneous. On being given the
standard Stage IV-V, V-VI transition tasks, the infants in
BrunskjIL's study, like those in Experiment I, performed very poorly.
There was no transfer of success between the two task contexts.
here featural information was available to cue the infant's search
strategy, the infants appeared to be capable of using such
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information to direct their actions appropriately and hence could
avoid the problem posed by the relationship of the object to the
cup.
In sum, if the infant's successful performance with transparent
cups in Experiment I was merely a result of contingent rule formation
as suggested above, there should be no difference in their ability
to find an object placed inside a transparent as opposed to an
opaque cup if a cross sectional testing procedure is employed.
Experiment two was designed to see if this wa3 the case.
2.3. EXPERIMENT II
Subjects. Twenty-seven infants between seven and 15 months of age
were run through the Stage IV—V, V-Vl Object Concept tasks with
opaque and transparent containers. Seventeen did the opaque test
first while ten were run in the reverse order.
Analysis. The same type of analysis was used as in Experiment
one. The stage the infant had reached in the Object Concept scale
was determined by his ability to cope with the Stage III-IV, IV-V,
V-VI t asks.
Performance Stage
Fail Stage III-IV task III
Fail Stage IV-V task IV
Fail Stage V-VI task V
Pass Stage V-VI task VI
No infant wa3 observed to pass the Stage V-VI task before he could
pass the Stage III-IV and IV-V tasks.
TABLE 2s5. Results N = 27










The results are shown in TABLE 2:5« If the infant's difficulty with
transparent containers was unrelated to that with opaque containers
nine infants would have been at the same stage by chance. In fact
22 were at the same stage. We can thus reject the null hypothesis
that the two problems are unrelated (x = 28.04 df = 1 p < .001).
However five infants did better with transparent containers than
opauue. The null hypothesis that this results from misclassification
(p - .031 by binomial expansion test) can be rejected.
Discussion
The results of this study argue that the relative superiority of
performance with transparent containers in Experiment One was an
experimental artefact, arising from contingent rule formation during
longitudinal testing. Disappearance per se would, however, appear
to play a role,albeit a minor one,in Stage IV-V1 Object Concept
development.
The results of Experiment Two have been replicated and confirmed
by Butterworth (1975") •
2.4. SUPPORT!NO EVIDENCE FOR THE IDENTITY HYPOTHESIS
There is another spatial relation that violates the infant's
rules of object identity at this age, that is the relation placed
upon. Ibis relation involves two objects being in the same place at
the same time. It involves the sharing of one spatial boundary.
According to the identity hypothesis the infant should show Stage
III—IV, IV—V, V—VI Object Concept type behaviour when dealing with
this relation. That this is the case has been demonstrated by Piaget
(1937) and Bower and Wishart (1976).
Piaget following the work of Sssuman and Bailey (1927) observed
that an infant of six months of age would reach quite happily for an
object that was dangling in free space or pi !<Jed upon a large surface
area such a3 a floor or a table top. If the object was placed upon
a 3mall support the infant would however, react with distress and
refuse to reach for the object at all, behaviour that is very similar
to that observed when the object is hidden by a cup (FIGURE 2:2).
The infant reaches in The reach is withdrawn or the infant
free space and distress ensues reaches for object
+ platform as a whole
Alternatively the infant would reach out with his hand shaped to
encompass the object + platform as a whole. If the object was then
to drop off the platform the infant would react with surprise and
distress (FIGURE 2:3).
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Such behaviour suggests that the placing of X on Y was perceived by
the infant as the disappearance of X and the reappearance of a new
object X + Y as predicted by the identity hypothesis.
"ichotte (1962) and Bresson and de Schonen (1976) have however
taken issue with this explanation of the infant's difficulty with the
relation'placed upon; I'ichotte has suggested that the imam's difficulty
with this relation is perceptual rather than conceptual in origin.
If this was the case then the degree of surface contact between the
object and the platform would affect the infant's behaviour.
Unfortunately, the degree of common boundary between the two objects
would also be predicted to affect the infant's response if the infant's
difficulty was conceptual in origin. However, a perceptual explanation
of tbe infant's difficulty would predict that if the infant was given
the Stage IV-V Object Concept transition task with platforms no place
errors would be observed. By contrast if the infant's difficulty
with the relation 'placed upon* is conceptual in origin then such
errors would be expected. Bresson and de Schonen take a similar line
of attack to iviichotte. They argue that the infant's difficulty wit,ft
the relation 'placed upon' is perceptuo-motor in origin. The edges
of the platform are argued to create motion parallax information which
attracts the infant's reach from being directed towards the object,
which produces less motion parallax towards the platform. In support
of their argument Bresson and de Schonen point out that before the
onset of visually guided reaching infants will reach in a ballistic
fashion for the object and remove it from the platform. ven later
when the infant is unable to reach and remove the object from the
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platform he will nevertheless attempt to remove it with his mouth.
However this evidence does not constitute a sound attack cn a conceptual
explanation of the infant's difficulty with the relation 'placed upon.'
rior to the onset of visually guided reaching1 those infants who
successfully removed the object from the platform by employing a
ballistic reach did so only for ,?01 of the test trial® (de Scbonen pers
cornm). "Such a low success rate could merely reflect the operation .of
chance. Likewise if the infant responds to an object on a platform
with his mouth he could be argued to be merely responding to "a
protuberance on the platform' rather than an object whose identity was
distinguishable from the platform. 4s with Vichotte'a argument., Bresson
and de SchiJnen's argument would predict that the infant would make no
St a. e IV-V 'bject Concept t -pe errors if given the tags 1V-V transition
task with platforms. It would also predict that the degree of contact
between the object and the platform would have no effect cn the infant's
response.
ichotte and Bresson and de chonen's criticisms of the 'loss of
identity' explanation of the infant's difficu&ty with the relation 'placed
upon' have been evaluated.
Bower and 'ishart (I97f% have replicated ia et'e study,
controlling for any difference between the motor requirements for
reaching in free spac* as opposed to reaching for an object on the
platform. They observed the same results as Tiaget and farther
observed that the amount of difficulty the infant had in reaching for
+he object on i platform was a function of how much common boundary
the object and platform had (Bower 19775• V round object was easier
to obtain than a square object (FI0UBT5 4) - 1 ' esult contrary to
"V peft.5 . comrvq .
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that predicted by Bresson and de Schonen
Bower and /'iahart also extended their observations to Stage 3V-V
transition tasks with platforms, placing the object on one of two
platforms rather than under one of two cups. The infants studied
were observed to make Stage P'-V Object Concept type errors. Having
observed the object placed on one platform twice, then placed on the
other, they would search for the object on the original platform.
This type of error suggests that the infant's difficulty with the
relation 'placed upon' was of conceptual rather than perceptual or
perceptual-motor origin as argued by Michotte, and Bresson and de
Schonen respectively. 'Placed upon' does however appear to be an
easier relation for the child to comprehend than 'inside.' Mo Stage
IV-V errors were observed in infants beyond 34 weeks of age. (Bower
and .Vishart 1976). This was possibly due to the fact that the object
shares only one spatial boundary with the support. Also, in this
situation as in Experiment I, the object + support offers some of the
featural information that characterised the object whose identity
is lost.
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The identity hypothesis would also predict that the young infant
would be unable to comprehend that if an object was placed upon
another object, movement of the latter object would also result in
movement of the former object. That thi3 is the case is reported
by Piaget (1937)» The young infant will not pull a support in order
to obtain an object that is outwith reaching distance on the support
(FIGURE By six months of age he vdll pull the support in
order to obtain the object (FIGURE 2:5a). If the object is now
placed to the side of the support the infant will pull the latter and
be surprised not to have ob+ained the object again (FIGURE 2:5b).







The studies reported in thi3 chapter clearly demonstrate that
even if the object is not hidden in the Stage III-VI transition tasks
but rather placed inside a transparent container or on a platform
in full view of the infant, he will nevertheless fail to search
appropriately for it. disappearance as a major source of difficulty
in the Stage IJI-VI tasks is not disappearance due to an object
moving out of sight but rather disappearance in the sense of the loss
of the identity, individuality of an object when it enters into a
spatial relationship with another object that involves the sharing of
object boundaries and spatial position.
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CHATTER III
FURTHER "IV ALUATI ON OF THE IDENTITY HYPOTHESIS
In Chapter I it was argued that the hypothesis that development
through the later stages of the Object Concept was development of
the infant's understanding of spatial relationships between objects
that involve the sharing of object boundaries, had several advantages
over alternative theoretical frameworks. One major advantage was
argued to be the fact that it avoids the need to postulate repetition
(Schaffer 1971) in the development of the Object Concept. The
competence with which the infant handles disappearance sequences as
assessed by his eye movements (Bower et al 1971> Yundy-Castle and
Anglin 1969)> as opposed to the incompetence he exhibits when his
reaching behaviour is observed in the Stage III—VI tasks was held to
be explicable in terras of the different types of spatial relationships
that existed between objects involved in the disappearance sequence in
each case. In the tracking studies the object moved behind a screen.
It thus entered into a spatial relationship between objects that
did not involve the sharing of spatial boundaries. This line of
argument made several assumptions. It assumes that if the infant's
understanding of the relationship 'inside' is assessed by observing
the infant's reaction to an object disappearing into a tunnel, the
results of such observations will also show that the infant does not
understand the relation 'inside'. Nelson (1973) in a study, not
actually designed for this purpose, observed this to be the case.
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5-7 month old infants would not anticipate the reappearance of the
object from within a tunnel. Likewise it is assumed that if the
infant is given Stage III-IV and 1V-V transition tests in which an
object is made to disappear by being covered by a screen he will
show none of the errors characteristic of Stage 1II-IV, 1V-V
transition test performance. He will be able to remove the
appropriate screen to obtain the object from behind. This assumption
has not been subject to empirical investigation. Its investigation
constitutes the basis of Hxperiraent III.
3; 1. HXP'TR^HIVf III
1 ubjeets. Hleven infants, twenty-two to thirty-seven weeks of age
served as subjects.
Apparatus♦ \ variety of small toys
Two white screens 6£" x 5"
Two white cloths 8" x 5"
Procedure
Each infant was given three Stage I1I-IV transition tests with the
cloth being used as the occluder. An object was placed in front of
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infant, on a tray outwith the infant's reach. It was then covered d
the cloth. The tray was then moved in towards the infant and his
behaviour observed.
I
After these trials the infant was given a new toy. Stage III-
IV transition testing was begun again. A screen was used to occlude
the object this time. Three trials were again given.
Following this, the infant was given another two Stage III-IV
transition tests with the cloth.
The order of presentation of this sequence v/as not varied on
purpose. '
If the infant could pass all the Stage III-IV transition tests,
Stage IV-V testing began. Two Stage IV-V tests using the cloth as
the occluder were given,followed by two Stage IV-V tests with screens
The side chosen as the A side in the AAB sequence was varied.
The complete session was video-taped for subsequent "analysis.
Analysis
n i ■ i.i i fa ■ ■
t
Trials in which the infant knocked over the screen + object,
rather than reached for either were discounted. So too were trials
in which the infant simply sat sucking the screen for more than one
\
minute;
The infant was scored as successfully completing the Stage III-I1
test with screens and/or with cloths if he
(l) showed no surprise or distress to the disappearance of the
objeot.
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(2) successfully removed the occluder for the object.
(3) showed no distress or surprise to the reappearance of the
object.
■
Surprise was taken to be indicated if
(1) the infant's eyes widened
(2) his eyebrows raised
(3) his mouth fell into a shape
(4) hi3 body drew back from the toy.
Distress was indicated by
(1) crying which was specific to the stimulus situation




Of the eleven infants studied eight were at Stage III of the
Object Concept Scale and three were at Stage IV.
Of the eight infants at Stage III 3even removed the screen but
not the cloth. The remaining one infant reacted with distress to
Stage II1-IV testing with cloths and with screens.
The three infants at Stage IV passed the Stage IV-V transition
test with screens and failed the test with cloths.








IV 0 0 3
CLOTH
V 0 0 0
TEST
Thus the null hypothesis that behind transformations are as much of a
problem as inside transformations may be rejected (p < .05 binomial
expansion te3t). Such a result supports the hypothesis that the child
comprehends the relation •behind' before the 'relation'inside'and
that the behaviour modality used to assess comprehension of these
relations i3 irrelevent.
However two of the seven infants who removed the screen but not
the cloth in the Stage III-IV test were somewhat efebiguous in their
behaviour. Although they showed no distress to the occlusion of the
object and picked it up within fifteen seconds of removing the screen,
the intentionality, goal directedness of their behaviour was difficult
to assess.
Of the remaining five infants, four out of the five reached round
the screen at least once for the object. Such behaviour questions
Bruner's claim (i960) that infants of this age are limited to a reach
along the line of 3ight.
Discussion
The results of Experiment IV support the premise that it is
irrelevent whether eye movements or reaching is used to assess the
6 ■
infant's understanding of the relation 'behind'. All of the infants'
bar one demonstrated understanding of the relation 'behind' but not
'inside* in their reaching behaviour.
However Harris/jpefts. Com«)and iiutterworth (pers comm) have argued that
;!xperiment IV provides insufficient evidence for the validity of the
above premise. They argue that the infants could cope with the Stage
ITT-TV task with screens but not with cloths because removal of the
former is a raotorically easier task. This criticism does not of
course apply to the infants* superior performance in the Stage IV-V
task with screens. However as only three infants participated in
thi3 latter study the statistical significance of this result can
hardly be evaluated.
To provide further evidence for the validity of the above prerais e
the number of infants studied in the Stage IV-V transition task was
increased, by a longitudinal study of the infants who had participated
in Experiment IV. If the above premise is correct it is predi-ted
that the infants would have no difficulty in coping with the Stage IV—
V transition task provided that the object was hidden behind a screen
rather than hidden by a cloth. 'hcperimentIV was designed to evaluate
this prediction.
3.2. EXPERIMENTIV
Subjects: To the eleven infants who served as subjects in Experiment
III were added another five infants, giving a total sample size of
sixteen infants. The mean age of the infants studied was 32.3 weeks, the
range of ages was from 22 to 45 wks.
Proce dure The Infants were seen weekly as far as possible. The
infants who could not pass the Stage IU-IV test with cloths were
given this test weekly with screens and cloths until they could do so.
They were then given the stage IV-V transition test with cloths and
screens. Those infants who could, on the onset of this study,pass
the Stage I1I-IV test with both types of occluders were given the
Stage IV-V test on a weekly basis until they could pass this test.
The slide-in tray arrangement which had been used in Experiment
IV was abandoned. Instead the mother was asked to prevent the infant
reaching for the object while it was being covered by gently holding
him under the armpits, the procedure which had been used in
Experiment Two.
The criteria for passing the Stage IV-V transition test was
upgraded to 3/3 correct AAB sequences on two consecutive weeks for
both types of occluder.
Analysis
Stage III-IV test
If the infant unambiguously passed this test by removing the
screen/cloth for the object he was given a score of two.
If he removed the screen or cloth but the intentionality of his
behaviour, his orientation towards the object was dubious he was given
a score of one.
If he failed the test completely he was given a score of zero.
A one way analysis of variance was carried out on the group scores
as a function of occluder in order to determine whether the infants*
performance in the Stage III-IV task with screens was superior to that
with cloths.
Stage IV-V test
If the infant successfully retrieved the object on each trial of
the two A A3 tests he was deemed to have passed that test. If he made
an error in either of the test sequendes he was deemed to have failed
that test. The infants' performance in this te3t when screens were
used as occluders as opposed to cloths was evaluated by means of a one
way analysis of variance.
Results
Of the 16 infants studied 8 were at Stage III of the Object
Concept 3cale at the onset of testing. ""hey were given the Stage
III-IV transition task for five testing sessions i.e. untill all had
passed it. Table 3:2 summarises their performance during this period.
It includes the results from Experiment IV.






















Treatments 80'b / SO-6
£6-6 /,
Error U'V 4 6-v
&1
Total loi'3
For o< = .05 elf * 1,4- ? ratio • . As the obtained F • /2.- 0,
the results are 'Significant and the null hypothesis that there is
no difference in the infants' performance with'behind'transformations
as opposed to inside'transformations c.<w be rejected.
Stage IV-V testing
Table 3:4 compares the infants' performance in the Stage IV-V
transition test when screens as opposed to cloths are U3ed as occluders.
TABLE 3:4 (N - 16)
Session
No of errors made in
the Stage IV-V task
with screens
No of errors made












Results of One-D'ay Analysis of Variance on Table 3; 4 - 6/95er> cm first











Treatment <20-1 1 &>•/ 50-// •f'
Error lo^'V 4 <251 *25< 7J
Total iaa, S
For <3< = .05 df = 1, 4- F ratio « 1*11 . As the obtained F is less
than one the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the
infants' performance in the Stage IV-V task with 'behind' transform¬
ations as compared to 'inside' transformations cannot be rejected.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment IV do not support the premise that infants
of six to eight months of age can understand the relation 'behind' but
not the relation 'inside' irrespective of what behaviour modality is
used to assess their competence. The results support Harris and
Lutterworth's contention that the infants initial superior performance
with screens in the Stage III-1V task, demonstrated in Experiment IV,fQ
was merely a reflection of the fact that a screen is motorically easier
for the infant to handle than a cloth. The infants' superior
performance in the Stage IV-V task in Experiment III would appear to be
an artefact due to the small sample size studied.
Curiously, as Table 3:6 demonstrates mixed practice with'behind'













IV 26.4 wks 3.8 34.1 3.9 8
Infants given practice
with cloths alone
26.0 aks 48.6 33
From - Bower & Wishart (1972)
This suggests that perhaps successive testing wi th'behind' and 'inside'
relations in the same experimental session could have caused the infants1
ability to cope with the former type of relation to deteriorate. If
this was the case then infants of seven months of age, naive to the
Object Concept tests, should have no difficulty in coping with the
Stage IV-V test if screens alone were used as occluders. A short
experiment tested this hypothesis. Four thirty-five week old infants
were given the Stage IV-V transition test twice,with screens alone
being used as occluders. All four failed this te3t.
hy the infants studied in Experiment IV showed .accelerated
development through Stage IV remains a mystery. As the number of
infants tested in Experiment IV is small it could be that they were not
a 'randomised sample'. They had perhaps previous experience of dealing
with objects hidden under or behind things at home, f at such ex erience
affects development through the Object Concept Stages is demonstrated
by Graph 3:1, drawn from the data of Experiment|V. ^he agQ at which
the infant was exposed to the Stage IV-V transition task is clearly













15 i il W 11 to M 8 31 #t 3S Jfc M OT 40 *2 4t i<* is
Auvs a.x oKi^t-r op Sta&£ iv -v te.srii\6.
As Graph 3:1 demonstrates age of onset of Stage IV-V testing
correlated with age of attainment of Stage V. For o<. = .05
N = 16 *Y = *35 Obtained 'Y = .80
71
CTUPTTIR IV
PROBLEMS '.VITH THE IDENTITY HYPOTHESIS
DISCONTINUITY IN DEVELOP;/ ;KT?
The fact that the infant is as likely to err in the Stage 1V-V
Object Concept task when the object is hidden behind a screen as when
it is hidden inside a cup or under a cloth challenges the model of the
development of the Object Concept presented in this thesis.
This model assumed continuity in development. The problems of
Stage 1 and II were those of developing criteria of object identity in
terms of the object's spatial position, path of movement and featural
characteristics. Resolution of these problems resulted in the infant
being faced with new ones - those of relationships between objects.
Each stage of the developmental sequence was characterised as a building
block or stepping stone for the next.
The results of Experiment IV, however, suggest discontinuity in the
developmental sequence. Understanding of the spatial rel a+ion'behind",
inferred from the infant's eye movements is clearly demonstrated by 4a to
5 months of age (Bower et al 1971* ' undy-Cas+.le and ^nglin); would
appear to be lost around 6 to 7 months.of age (Sxp.iv) only to return
again around 8 to 9 months of age. These results thus give the
appearance of repetition in the development of the Object Concept.
This repetition appears specific to the infant's competence in dealing
with the spatial relation behind as the work of Nelson (1973) reported
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in Chapter III indicated no difference in the infant's understanding
of the relationship 'inside' as a function of whether eye movements
or reaching behaviour was used.
4.2. VODGLS rYF DISCONTINUITY
by should the infant have any difficulty in coping with the
relationship 'behind' in the Stage IV-V transition task"?
One possibility, that offered by Schaffer, has already been
discussed. He has argued that the knowledge that controls the infant's
eye movements in Bower et al's studies is 'compartmentalized'. It
does not initially control the infant's reaching behaviour as well.
Certainly support for this approach is to be found in studies of
differences in the rate at which the infant will habituate to repeated
presentations of an object as measured by amount of visual as opposed to
manual exploration of the latter (Schaffer 1971).
However, this type of argument does not appear capable of dealing
with the data at hand. If Schaffer's model was correct the infant
would be expected to look to the correct screen on the catch trial of
the Stage IV-V transition task but to reach to the wrong one.
Although such behaviour has been observed (Brown 1973, Vishart pars
coram) it occurs infrequently. Generally eye and hand operate in a
co-ordinated fashion in the Stage IV-V task.
Contained within ^iaget's writings (1937) is however the
suggestion that processes of conceptual development recur whenever a
concept must be used on a different level. Generalisation of the
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infant's understanding of the spatial relation 'behind' from tracking
tasks to reaching tasks could, within this approach, be argued to poae
a problem for the infant because of the eye - hand co-ordinated
activity required in the latter task . This "iagetian approach to
the phenomenon of ret edition would suggest that the infant's ability
to track an object behind a screen would also be poor i? the object
could also be reached for.
\ third approach to this problem of apparent repetition in the
development of the Object Concept m y be found in the work cf ower
(1974b). bower points out that in certain instances of repetition in
development such as those involving walking and .auditory-manual co¬
ordination the infant appears to lose an ability. Ha suggests that the
infant's poor performance in the Stage 1V-V transition task may reflect
total loss of the knowledge the infant utilised to cope with the
tracking tasks at 5 months of age.
The Piagetian approach to this apparent repetition in the develop¬
ment of the Object Concept would thus suggest that the infant's ability
to demonstrate understanding of the spatial relation behind would
selectively deteriorate as a function of whether in such tasks the infant
could reach for the object as well. The alternative approach, drawn
from the work of Bower would predict that the infant's ability to track
ar< object behind a screen would deteriorate at around 6 months of age
irrespective cf whether the object could be reached for or not.
Experiment VI was designed to evaluate these alternative hypothesis.
4.3. '-7It';:.'-WT V
Subjectsi Twelve infanta, naive to tracking tasks served as subject.
The infants were grouped according to ages 4—4* months (N=4) b—'months
(N«4) 6-61 months ($«4).
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Proce dure & Materials
A brightly coloured train was the object. It moved round a
semi-circular track at a speed of 25 cms/sec. The radius of the
track was 8j inches. At each end of the track were brackets which
caused the train to stop or to reverse its direction of movement.
The train could thus be kept in continuous motion. The track was
nailed to a white table top in front of which the infant sat on his
mother's knee. The infant's body midline was aligned with the centre
of the track.
Two tracking conditions were employed. In Condition A the infant
was given two warm up trials during which the object moved back and
forth, in continuous motion, along the track. A white screen 8" x 6"
was then placed in the centre of the track at a distance of I1." from
the rails. The infant was then given ten trials of the object moving
back and forth behind the screen. His eye movements were recorded by
means of a video unit.
In Condition B the infant was again given two warm-up trials.
This time the object was stopped at each end of the track. The white
screen was again placed in the centre of the track. The infant was
then given ten trials of the object moving back and forth along the
track. This time however the object stopped for seven seconds at
each end of the track and the infant was permitted to reach for it.
His eye and hand movements were recorded.
Tach infant participated in both conditions. The order of
presentation of the conditions was counter-balanced across babie3.




The following scoring system was adopted.
a" If the infant failed to attend on a yiven trial he was iven a
score of zero.
fb If the infant searched for the object at either «nd of the track
when it disappeared he was given a score of 1. This behaviour
was argued to corns arable to *hat observed in ft age II-III of
the development of the vjeo+ Concept ( iaget 1937) (lower et al
1971'.
(c) If the infant stared at the edge of the screen behind which the
object aad disappeared he was riven a score of 2. his
behaviour is comparable to +age III of the development of the
object concept when the infant will not remove a cloth to obt in
the object.
(d If the infant anticipated the reappearance of the object from
behind the screen he was given score of 3.
'."his scoring system may be argued to comprise an ordinal scaling system
of the infant's tracking responses. Anticipating an object's
re-.ppea mcc from behind the screen is a more : reductive strategy than
merely looking fo the latter in its usual spatial position. f"he
former type of response thus stands in the relation 'greater than' or
'bettor than' to the latter tyre of response.
Consequently the statistics used to analyse the data are as follows.
(l) To examine the effe-t of condition on the infant's response
the llcoxin Watched Pairs si--ned-ranks test was used as the same
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infant participated in both conditions.
(?) To examine the effect of age on the infant's response the
'"ruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks was used as the
infants tested were a cross-sectional sample. The infants tracking
scores were summed across conditions in this analysis: no interaction
of age and condition was predicted and examination of the data
suggested none.
rhe level of significance was set at o( = .05 in both cases. In the
ilcoxin latched 'airs signed-ranks test it was predicted that the
infant's performance in the tracking condition in which he could not
reach for the object would be better than that, in which he could.
Consequently a one-tailed test significance level of <X .05 was used.
Results








1 21 23 — 2 - 3
? 20 8 + 1^ + 12
3 18 16 -t- 2 + 3
4 20 13 + 7 + 10
5 17 26 - Qy - 11
6 27 26 + 1 + 1
7 27 30 - 1J - 6.5
8 27 29 - 7 - 3.0
0
J 11 14 - 3 - 6.5
1 19 22 - 3 - 6.5
11 19 24 - 5 - 9.0
1? ?0 17 + 3 + 6.5
77
Sum of ranka of positive sign = 32.5
wum of ranks of negative sign = 45*5
T ~ 3?.5
At CX • .05 and M • 1? T must be equal to or less than 17.
As observed V is greater thin 17'
The null hypothesis that the infant's tracking performance i3 unaffected
by whether the object can also be reached for cannot be rejected.
Conclusion: het'ner the infants could/could not reach for the object
while tracking the latter had no effect on their tracking behaviour.
The iagetian explanation of the a. irent re: etition in the development
of the infant's understanding of the relation 'behind* is thus not
supported.





C - 61: K
Age
5 - 5'- M
Age
4 - 4f M
1 44 43 25
2 28 53 41
3 34 ^7 43
4 33 56 37
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4 - 45 h
1 Q 7.5 1
2 2 10.0 6
3 4 11.0 7.5
4 3 12.0 5-0
Sum cf






j - 3 (N-l)
j~l
* 6 .Of
kt o( * .05 and » 4» 4» 4« H must be equal to or greater than
5.67'3» u the obtained : is greater than 5*6923t the null hypothesis
that. the infants' trackin, responses do not vary as a function of age
ciay be rejected. s Graph 4:1 clearly demonstrates the 5-5g month old
infants were more competent in tracking an object behind another than






Conclusion; The results of this analysis would appear to support
lower's argument that infants around 6 months of ape begin to lose
their understanding of the spatial relation behind.
The 4-4^ month old infants within this anal sis are 3een to be
poorer trackers than the r>—'5.^ month old infants as they are s+ill
developing an understanding of this re'atIon.
Discussion
These results do not show that competence in tracking an object
behind a screen varied as a function of whether the infant could/could
not reach for it, as was predicted. Interestingly, however,the 6 to
6I month old infant is observed to be considerably poorer than the 5 to
5s month old infant in tracking the object behind the screen. Not
only do infants of this age appear unable to demonstrate understanding
of the relation 'behind* in their reaching behaviour, they appear
unable to demonstrate understanding of this relation by their eye
movements either.
This latter statement must however be qualified. This experiment
utilised the cross-sectional method of studying developmental trends.
It is not certain therefore that the poor tracking behaviour demonstrated
by the 6-63 month old infants reflected a decline in their ability to
comprehend the spatial relation'behind"•© do not know that they ever
possessed this ability. Variation in rates of development could
theoretically be responsible for the observed decline in performance.
Two facts support this argument. Firstly only 4 infants were studied
in each age group and secondly significant between subject differences
were observed.
It could also be argued that Txperiment V was not an adequate
test of the hypothesis that it is difficulty in eye - hand co-ordination
that is responsible for the infant's failure in the Stage III-V Object
Concept tests with screens. Although in Experiment V , the infant
was only permitted to reach for the object in one tracking condition
both tracking conditions involved the object moving along a trajectory
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that was within reaching distance. The postulated 'eye-hand' schema
for object displacements behind another object could thus be argued to
have been activated in both conditions. Thus the predicted difference
in the 6-6* month old infants tracking behaviour as a function of
condition was not observed.
If the above argument is plausible,it is predicted that the infant
would be unable to consistently anticipate the re-appearance of an
object from behind a screen if the object moved along a trajectory
that was within reaching distance. He would be able to do so if the
latter was outwith reaching distance.
Experiment VI was designed to evaluate this hypothesis.
4-4- EX?:"illrENT VI
Subjects
Twenty infants, 6* to 8 mpnths of age, served as subjects.
All were naive to tracking tasks.
Apparatus
r,1wo featurally identical Russian dolls of height 4-4 and c inches
served as objects. The former was used in the Near Space condition,
the latter in the Distant Space condition.
Object movement was effected by attaching the object to a steel
pole that protruded through a semi circular groove cut on a table top.
This pole was then connected to a Iodine Motor operated by a Power
8
Controller Unit. Two semi-circular grooves were used. In the Near
Space condition a groove was cut at a distance of 14 inches from the
edge of a table-top, a distance of 8 inches from the infant. In the
Distant Space condition a groove was cut at a distance of 22 inches
from the edge of a table top, a distance of 16 inches from the infant.
NEAR CONDITION DISTANT CONDITION
FIGURE 4ll.
Two semi-circular frames made out of transparent perspex were used
as screens. In the Near Condition the frame was of circumferance 27
ins. and divided into three sections. The middle section, width 15
ins. was transparent while the outer sections were painted black, width
6 ins. each. The frame was 101 ins. tall. In the Distant Condition
the frame was of circumference 36 ins. The middle section of the
frame was 20 ins. in width,the two black outer sections were of width
8 ins. The ratio of opaque to transparent area of the frame in this
latter condition was thus the same as that employed in the Near Space
condition. The frame was 21 ins. tall.
In the Near Condition the frame was set at a distance of from
the groove along which the object moved. In the Distanfccondition it
w
a:
was set at a distance of 1".
The apparatus was thus designed such that the projected size and
shape of the object, its distance of separation from the frame, the
height and relative areas of transparent to opaque sections of the
frames,were kept constant in both the I.'ear and Distant Space Conditions.
The object moved at a speed of 25 cms/sec in both conditions.
The same rate of retinal displacement was thus maintained.
The design of the apparatus is shown in Figure 4s2.
tracking cond. near space DISTANT SPACE
objpct size 4.7" 8£"



















25 cm/sec 25 cm/sec
a
The whole experiment was video recorded for subsequent analysis. A
split screen was used. One camera was positioned above the track and
filmed the object's movement. The other camera was positioned behind
the background screen, its lens projecting through a hole in the latter.
It recorded the infant's eye and hand movements.
Proceedure:
The infant sat on his mother's knee at the table-top. The
experimenter was positi ned behind the background screen, operating
the controls of the object'3 displacement. A video screen enabled her
to determine the object's position on the track. The infant's mother
was instructed tr give t e infant postural support where necessary but
to allow him as much freedom of movement as was possible. The purpose
of the experiment was not explained to her beforehand. he was warned
that the infant might want to look at sections of the trac^ other than
where the object was. hhe was to allow him to do so.
Each of the twenty infants were assigned to one of the two
tracking conditions. Each was tested in both conditions. A day
separated each testing- session.
In each condition the infant v/as given two warm up trials in
which the object just moved back and forth along the track. "esting
proper then began.
In the Near Condition the object moved alonr a trajectory which
was within reach of the infant. The object was initially positioned
at the centre of the track. The appropriate frame was then placed
in front of the track. The object was visible at the centre of the
8 -
transparent section of the frame. The object wa3 then moved from
the centre of the track, position A,to the right or left of the track,
position 5 or C. The object thus passed behind the opaque section
of the frame. The object remained at 13 or C for 7 seconds during which
time the infant was permitted to reach for it if he so wished. The
object was then returned to the centre of the track and the movement
sequence repeated. On the 3rd trial the direction of the object
movement was changed. If it had moved from A. to B on the first two
trials it now moved from A to C. If it had moved from A to C on the
first two trials it now moved to E. The sequence of object displace¬
ment is thus formally identical to that used in the 'Itage IV-V
transition test with screens. Three such displacement sequences were
given. The direction of the object's initial displacement in each
sequence was randomised across the infants studied.
In the Pistant Condition the object moved along a trajectory
outwith the infant'3 reaching distance. The infant could thus no
longer reach for the object at the end of the displacement sequence.
ther.vise the proce dure used in this condition was identical to that
used in the Hear Space Condition.
Dl 5PLACETENT SEQUENCE. FIGURE 4:3.
TRIAL ONE TRIAL THO TRIAL THREE
A - B A - B A - C
6
Results
None of the twenty infants studied attended to all three
displacement sequences in both conditions. Three infants refused
to attend at all in either condition. Four infants attended to all
three displacement sequences in the Near Condition and two did so in
the Distant Condition.
Variation in attention as a function of Condition and order of
displacement sequence
As selective inattention could be a function of the infant's
cognitive capacity to deal with an event (Kagan 1965 , Piaget 1952 ) ,
a two way analysis of variance was performed to see if the infants'
attention varied as a function of (a) condition, (b) which of the three
displacement sequences the infant was observing. Between subject
differences in attention was used as an estimate of error.
For each trial attended to the infant was given a score of one.
Thus for each displacement sequence the infant could score a total of
three points, nine points in all in each condition. Table 4:3
summarises the results of this analysis. The three infants who did
not attend at all in either condition were excluded from analysis.
table 4*3







Condition (i) .9803921 1 .9803921 li
.9803921
3.063715 3 200 NS
Displ.Seq.(K) 30.88232 2 15.44116 lk
15.44116
.7640905 20.2085 .ca
Cond/Displ.Seq. .72549 2 .3627472 lik
.3627472
.5398002 .6720 ns
Subject (l) 51.49007 16 3.218129
Cond/Subj. 49.01944 16 3.063715





Whether the object moved within reaching distance or outwith was
observed to have no effect on the infant's attention (P <Cl.CO).
'''he number of displacement sequences that the infant observed did have
an effect on his attention in a later sequence as Graph 4s? illustrates.






The lack of attention paid by the infant3 in this study made
their tracking behaviour difficult to analyse.
4 types of responses to the displacement of the object behind the
screen were noted.
(]) The infant simply looks away from the track or fails to
attend at all.
(2) The infant searches for an object where it had been seen
before i.e. at A (centre of the track) or at either end of the track B
or C. Such a response is characteristic of the Stage IJ-III infant.
(3) The infant stared at the edge of the screen, the point where
the object disappeared. Such a response is characteristic of the
infant who fails the Stage II1-JV task but passes the Stage 11-111 task.
8?
(4) The infant anticipated the reappearance of the object by
moving his eyes to the appropriate edge of the screen before the object
reappeared or within 15 tn/sec of its reappearance. luch a response
is generally taken (Bower et al 1971) as indicating that the infant
understands the relation 'behind'.
If whether the object moved along a trajectory in hear as opposed
to Distant space, had an effect on the infant's response to the
displacement of the object behind the screen, it would be predicted
that the number of anticipatory responses made to the object in the
distant condition would be greater than those made in the rear condition.
In the case where the infant anticipated the reappearance of the
object on the A trials of the AAb sequence in both conditions it would
also be predicted that on the B trial the infant would fail to make an
anticipatory response and instead look for the object where it had been
previously "ound ( \ side) in the near condition but would continue to
anticipate its reappearance in the distant condition. Unfortunately
the infants generally changed their type of response to the displacement
of the object between trials. This fact prevented a straight
comparison of response strategies across conditions. Further as the
infant's response to the A trials was not constant, change of that
response on the B trials could not be evaluated. Consequently, two
types of analysis of the infant's tracking behaviour were employed.
(l) The predominant response strategy used by the infant in each
condition was examined. If whether the object moved within reaching
distance of the infant detrimentally affeet4d his tracking responses,
then it would be predicted that, if anticipating the reappearance of
the object in the Distant Condition was his dominant response strategy
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then he would change this strateg, to one of the poorer types of
responses In the Near Condition. This hypothesis was examined by
means of the 'cbemar test for the significance of changes. Tie infant's
dominant tracking strategy within each displacement sequence within
each condition was separately scored.
(?) The infants* tracking strategies may be scaled in an ordinal
fashion, identical to that used in "xperiment V. Again if the movement
of the object within reaching distance of the infant had a detrimental
effect on his tracking behaviour, it would be predicted that the tracking
strategies used by the infant in this condition would be oorer than these
used in the Distant Condition. This prediction would be reflected in
the infants' tracking scores being greater in the latter as opposed to
the former situation. This hypothesis was examined by noons of the
ilcoxin "atched Pairs signed ranks test.
Results








OTHTR 28 n sequences
x2 = .27
For o( » ,05 and df » 1 7
?
3.84
Conclusion: As the observed value of X2 is less than 3.84 the null
hypothesis that there is no difference in the dominant response
strategy that the infant uses in the Near as opposed to Distant space
condition cannot be rejected.
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T13LF 4- Sc Differences in the infants' overall tracking scores as




NEAR CONDITION d RANK of d
1 4 15 — 11 - 13.5
2 5 15 - 10 - 12.0
3 16 24 - 8 - 10.0
4 11 18 - 7 - 9.0
5 16 27 - 11 - 13.5
6 11 14 - 3 - 4.0
7 14 13 + 1 + »—< o
8 23 25 - 2 + 2-5
9 16 14 + 2 + 2.0
10 0 20 - 20 - 2 0
11 12 6 + 6 + 6
12 7 1 + 6 + 6
13 23 27 - 4 - 4
14 14 5 + 9 + 9
15 15 0 + 15 - 15
16 0 6 - 6 - 6
17 6 6 0
Gum of negative ranked signs = 9?»5
Sum of positive ranked signs = 43.5
Direction of difference in the scores is contrary to that predicted
Observed T = 43.5. For o< = .05 and N = 16 T "6= 30.
Conclusion: ,Js the observed T is greater than 30 the null hypothesis
that there is no difference in the infants' tracking scores as a
function of condition cannot be rejected.
Overall the proportion of anticipatory responses marie to the "bject's
disappearance in the bear pace Condition was .45» The proportion of
such responses observed in the Distant : pace Condition was .4r • is
Table 4:5 illustrates the proportion of anticipatory responses observed in
6
each condition was observed to be relatively constant. No significant
difference was observed between conditions.
TABLE 4«56
Source S.S. df. M.S. F ratio F value Significance
Conditions .03 1 .03 •03/.025 1.2 NS
Error .09 4 .025
Total .12 5
The infants' responses to the disappearance of the object on the catch
trial of the AB, AB, AC displacement sequence was also separately
examined. Rarely did the infants look for the object where it had
been previously found (at B) on the A-C displacement trial. Table
4:6 summarises the frequency of this response type.
TABLE 4:6
Proportion of Response Type 1st trial 2nd trial 3rd trial
Overall conditions 0.01 0.00 0.08
Near Space condition 0.03 0.00 0.10
Distant Space condition 0.00 0.00 0.04
Discussion
The criticism,that Experiment V was not an adequate test of the
hypothesis that it is problems in eye-hand co-ordination that is
responsible for infants of around 7 months of age failing the Stage
IV-V task with screens, is not upheld by the results of Experiment VI .
Whether the object moved along a trajectory that was within or without
9 J
reaching distance had no effect on his competence in dealing with the
disappearance of the object behind a screen.
In Experiment VI the number of times the infants anticipated
the reappearance of the object from behind the screen was considerably-
lower than that observed by Bower, Broughton and Moore (l97l) in a
similar study involving 20 week old infants (FIGURE 4:4). In this
latter study the proportion of anticipatory responses made was 1.00
in contrast to the .49 and *42 result of Experiment VT .
1st TRIAL 2nd TRIAL 3rd TRIAL
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Likewise in Experiment V" the competence demonstrated by the 6 to 6^
month old infants was significantly lower than that demonstrated by the
5-5h month old infants. These results suggest that, irrespective of the
behaviour modality used to assess his competence,the 7 month old infant
cannot demonstrate understanding of the relation 'behind' that he has,
in some sense 'lost the ability' that enabled him to do so at 5 months
of age.
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4. 5* A QUESTION of LITERAL RSPETITION IN DEVELOPMENT?
Is this suggestion feasible? One thing that it presumes is that
the infant did,at some point in development, have to learn to understand
the relation'behindAccording to Bower (197s) the infant's
perceptual system is tuned to decode the occlusion information specifying
X moving behind Y from birth. He argues that interpretation of
occlusion information by the infant is essential in order that the
infant can disambiguate the information that is provided about the
spatial lay-out of the world by motion parallax and optical expansion
information (see also Gibson 1969).
Secondly in his studies of the development of the infant's rules
of Object Identity during the first 5 months of life Bower (1974)
observed that the infant never had any difficulty in understanding the
relation'behind'per 3e. As mentioned earlier if an infant of seven
weeks of ag9 observed an object being hidden behind a screen, he was
surprised (heart-rate being used as an indicator) if the object was
not to be found in its original spatial position when the screen was
removed. '"'he infant was not surprised however if the object's features
changed while it was occluded. Likewise, the difficulty the infant of
12 to 16 weeks of age had in tracking an object behind a screen was
attributed to the peculiar iules of object identity that he generated
with. In the Bower, Eroughton and Moore study quoted above the infant
would look to B on the A-C displacement trial not because he did not
understand the relation behind but because he identified the object in
terms of its usual spatial position.
Thirdly if the argument is that the infant at seven months of age
has 'lost the ability' that enabled him to track an object behind a
screen appropriately, what we are really saying is that the infant has
lost the co-ordinated rules of Object Identity that he operates with
around twenty weeks of age. 7/e are suggesting that he returns, for
some mysterious reason, to defining an object's identity in terms of
its spatial location. This analysis does not seem feasible. If it
was the case then the Stage III-IV Object Concept task would not pose
any problem for the infant. Covering an object by a cup would be
viewed as transformation of the object rather than replacement of the
object by the cup, with no information as to where the object had gone.
The infant would thus be expected to simply accept the cup as a
•transformed object'. The distress reactions observed when infants
are given the Stage III-IV task certainly show that such 'simple
acceptance' does not occur.
4.6. f.'OTIV-1TI0K, ATTENTION AND PERFORMANCE
An alternative approach to the results of 'Experiment V and VI
is to suggest that either they are fluke results, the apparent decline
in the infants' tracking abilities simply being a function of
variation in rates of individual infants' development or that
motivational changes are responsible for the decline in the infants'
performance as a function of age. The infants' lack of attention in
both experiments would fit with such an analysis. This lack of
attention is in sharp contrast to the fascination with which infants
of twenty weeks of age will attend to tracking studies. Subject
variability observed in both studies could again reflect motivational
differencea.
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-owever, if w aceert a motivational explanation of the decline
of the infant ' performance in track!nr studies at 7 months of age
vre are still l»ft with the problem of accounting for the infants', of
this a,ce, failure to cope with the Ctag© II1-IV and JV-V transition
tasks when screens are used as occluders. Certainly a motivation
explanation of this failure cannot suffice.
further, the possible disjunction between the infant's compre¬
hension of the spatial relation 'behind' when eye movements as opposed
to reaching behaviour are used to assess competence, also suggests
that perhaps infanta of twenty weeks would be able to demonstrate
understanding of the relations 'in* and 'on' if their eye movements,
rather than their reaching behaviour, were used to assess their competence,
"he wort: of Nelson (1973) would appear to suggest that this would not
be the case. However, Nelson used a cross-sectional method of
sampling the infant's understanding of the relation Inside at various
ages. harther he did not report how well the infanta attended to his
tracking tasks. \b indicated in this chapter variation in individual
rates of development could well have affected the results of his study.
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CHAPTER V
A RE-EX All!NATTON CP THE DFVCLCPl^NTAL SFQUEFCE
5.1. WHAT OTHER INFORMATION 15 NEEDED
The model of the development of the Object Concept being proposed
in this thesis has thus run into several difficulties. Possible
variation in individual rates of development, possible motivational
changes and variation in measurements of understanding as a function
of the response system used, all appear to cloud the proposed picture
of the infant's understanding of the relations 'behind' 'on* and 'in'.
The only way to resolve these problems is by means of a longitudinal
study.
5.2. RULES OF OBJECT IDENTITY AND THE SPATIAL RELATIONS, IF, OH .AND
BEHIND
Firstly we need to establish the relation between the infant's
changing rules of object identity (Bower 1974)^ancl his developing
comprehension of the relations 'behind' 'in' and 'on*. If
(1) the relation behind'is observed to pose difficulty for the
infant which cannot be attributed to his having failed to co-ordinate
place and movement rules of object identity.
(2) and that difficulty with the relation 'behind' occurs at the
same time as 'difficulty' with the relations 'on' and 'in*.
(3) and that development of an understanding of these three
relations is synchronous.
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then it will be necessary to thoroughly review the model of the
development of the Object Concept proposed in this thesis. This
model does not predict any difficulty with the relation 'behind' as
objects participating in this relation do not share spatial boundaries,
occupy the same spatial position.
5.3. TI-F RELATION OF E^E MOVANT SEARCH STRATEGIES TO RWCHINff
BEHAVIOUR.
Secondly,we need to establish the exact nature of the correspondence
between the infant's competence as assessed by eye movements and as
assessed by reaching behaviour.
5.4. PERFORM\NCE VARIABLES AND THE QUESTION OF REPETITION IN
DEVELOPMENT
Thirdly, we know from Experiments VI and VII that the infant's
performance in tasks designed to observe his understanding of the
relation 'behind' by eye movements deteriorates at around the age
that the infant has difficulty in the Stage I1I-V tests with screens.
vVe do not know if this apparent deterioration is a function of the
cross-sectional testing procedure used in Experiments VI and VII.
If it was, it would be predicted that in a longitudinal study of the
infant's understanding of this relation no such deterioration would be
observed. If deterioration in performance is observed, the problem
then is to decide whether this is a function of motivational changes,
such as boredom with tracking studies,or is in some sense a function
of 'loss of competence'. If it is a function of the former variable
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then no improvement in the infant's tracking behaviour would be
predicted to occur when his competence in the Stage III-V reaching
tasks improved. The infan+'s tracking behaviour would be more likely
to be correlated with his degree of attention to the tracking task.
If the observed deterioration was a function of the latter factor,
improvement in the tracking task would be predicted to correlate with
improvement in the reaching tasks.
5*6. ,-lSHART A,'ID BO..'5 STUDY
With respect to points one and two raised in the above
discussion, ishart and Bower (1977) "studied a group of twenty-four
infants on a weekly basis from twelve to twenty-eight weeks of age.
Saeh week the infants were tested in two of the four possible tracking
conditions: tracking an object to and fro, tracking the object through
a tunnel, tracking it over a platform or finally, tracking it behind
a screen. The infant's eye movements were thu3 used to assess hi3
understanding of object identity and cf the relations 'in* 'on' and
'behind.'
As soon as an infant was capable of reaching for an object placed
on a large table-top, he was given the Stage III—IV and IV—V reaching
test3 with cups, platforms and screens. The reaching tasks were
always given after the tracking tasks on a weekly basi3, once started.
Figure 9:1 summarises the design of this study.
RS c.omrvi . fepogreo by Bowe£R (lR7£>)*
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FIGURE 5s1








Wishart and Bower (pers coram) report that Initially the infants in
this study, tracked the object through the tunnel, over the platform
and behind the screen. They^however,also continued to track the
object when it had stopped moving. Wishart and Bower (1977) thus
concluded that this apparent ability to understand the relations 'in'
•on* and 'behind* was not genuine. The infants' response to these
relations merely reflected the fact 4taat,at this age, they defined the
object in terms of its path of movement. By around sixteen weeks of
age, the infants stopped tracking the object when it itself stopped
moving, behaviour which indicated that by this age the infant had co¬
ordinated his place and movement definitions of object identity. So
far, so good. The infants' tracking behaviour was in accordance with
the rules of object identity attributed to them at this age by Bower
(1974). At sixteen weeks of age, however, the infants became upset by
the displacement of the object through the tunnel, over the platform
or behind the screen. They either stared at the entry point to the
tunnel, platform or screen as the object was displaced relative to the
latter or they looked for the object at the end points of the track.
However, after a few more weeks practise the infants could competently
track the object through, over or behind the tunnel, platform or screen.
Development of an understanding of the relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind'
as assessed by eye movements was observed to be roughly synchronous.
Wishart and Bower further observed, that in the tracking tasks, the
frequency of responses that were taken as indicative of an understanding
of the relations 'in' 'on* and 'behind' declined from around twenty-
four weeks of age. Thus the proportion of anticipatory responses
made to the disappearance of the object inside the tunnel or behind the
screen dropped. So too did the proportion of times the infants
smoothly tracked the object over the platform. This result suggests
that the decline in the performance of the 6 to 6-§- month old infants
observed in Experiment V and VI was not a function of the fact that
these two studies employed cross-sectional sampling techniques.
Transfer of understanding of the relations 'in' •on* and 'behind'
from the tracking to the reaching tasks was observed to be PERFECT,
provided that the infant was exposed to the reaching tasks within a
couple of weeks of demonstrating understanding of these relations in
the tracking tasks. In saying transfer was perfect, Wishart and Bower
mean that the above infants showed no difficulty in coping with the
Stage III-IV reaching task and made no errors in the Stage IV-V
transition tasks. If the onset of the reaching tasks was delayed
relative to when the infant could cope with the tracking tasks, then
transfer of understanding of the relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind' from
the latter to the former was poorer. In such cases the infants were
observed to make errors in the Stage IV-V tasks. However,the age at
which these infants could cope with the Stage III-IV and IV-V reaching
tasks wa3 considerably advanced relative to infants who did not have
any tracking experience prior to participating in these tasks, and
curiously more advanced relative to infants who had extensive training
experience. No simple monotonic relationship was thus observed
between practice in eye movement tasks and performance in reaching
tasks.
All of the infants studied by Wishart and Bower were observed to
cope with the Stage III-IV and IV-V tasks prior to twenty-eight weeks
of age.
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Wishart and Bower's study thus calls for a revision of the model
of the development of the Object Concept proposed in this thesis.
The relation 'behind' is observed to pose difficulties for the infant
that are not simply accountable by lack of co-ordination of the infant's
place and movement rules of object identity. Further^ understanding of
the relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind' appears to develop synchronouslyf
suggesting that each relation poses a similar problem to the infant.^
Also contained in Vishart and Bower's study is the observation
that the infants "tracking performance began to deteriorate around 24
weeks of age. This observation is relevant to point three raised in
the opening discussion. Hie implication of this observation is that
the deterioration in performance observed in Experiment V and VI was
not simply a function of the fact that the cross sectional method of
studying developmental trends was used. Cn longitudinal testing such
a decline is also observed. The question then is does this decline
reflect motivational influences such as changes in the infants' interest
in the task or does it reflect some sort of decline in their 'competence'
to understand the relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind'?
The fact that the infants in 'ishart and Bower's study continued
to competently cope with the Stage 1II-V test v.ith cups, screens and
platforms despite a decline in their tracking performance, argues against
the latter explanation. The suggestion then is that change in
motivational factors caused this change in performance.
In order to explore this suggestion more fully and to offer
1. Caution is required in evaluating this suggestion as the
infant's comprehension of these relations was studied in the
same experimental session.
lOf.
further support for it, twelve of the infants who participated in
Wishart and Bower's study were continued to be studied by myself over
the period twenty-nine to forty-two weeks of age. Their performance
in the tracking tasks wa3 contrasted to that of a group of twelve naive
infants of a similar age. None of the latter infants could cope with
the Stage IV-V tests at the onset of testing. If the decline in
performance in the tracking tasks was a function of motivational
changes then it would be expected that a relatively close correspondance
would exist between both groups of infants' attention and tracking
performance. Secondly it would be predicted that the naive group of
infants' performance in the Stage III—V tasks would improve to
perfection during the study. This improvement in the reaching tasks
would not be correlated significantly with any changes which may occur
in their tracking behaviour. This study and these predictions
constitute the basis of T,]xperiment VII .
5.6. EXPRRIVRNT VII
Subjects: Two groups of infants were observed. The first group f
referred to hereafter as the trained group, consisted of twelve
infants who had participated in "ishart and Bower's study. They could
competently cope with all the Stage III-V tasks at the onset of the
study.
The control group consisted of twelve infants naive to tracking
and reaching tasks. None of these infants could competently cope
with all the Stage III-V tasks at the onset of the study. All could
reach for an object placed on a large table top.
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The infants were all in their twenty-eighth week of life at the
onset of the study.
Apparatus
Figure 5*2 demonstrates the apparatus used in the tracking tasks.
FIGURE 5:2
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The tracking tasks were always given prior to the reaching tasks.
The tracking tasks were identical to those designed by ishart and
Bower with one difference. Wherea3 in "Vishart and Bower'3 study the
infant only had to track the object in relation to one other object,
in this study an additional condition was employed wherein the infant
had to track the object through/behind/over two tunnels, screens/
platforms in succession (FIGURE 5*3).
lOf
screen/tunnel/platform




This proceedure was employed to make the tracking tasks more comparable
to the reaching tasks.
Each week the infant was tested in two of the four tracking
conditions employed namely*
(1) Tracking the object to and fro in free space for eight
trials (a-b displacements).
(2) Tracking the object through/behind/over one tunnel screen or
platform for four trials followed by four trials in which
the object moved through two of the former.
Order of presentation of the tracking conditions was counter¬
balanced by means of a Latin square testing design. During the period
28 to 4? weeks each infant was given six testing sessions in each
condition. The infants were followed up on a roughly weekly basis.
The tracking sessions were video-filmed for subsequent analysis.
In the reaching tasks, two trials of the Stage III-IV transition
test with a platform/screen/cup were given. If the infant successfully
removed any of the latter on both trials for the object he was given
the Stage IV-V transition test. Two trials of this test were employed.
Criterion of passing the Stage IV-V transition test involving a given
io.fr
relation was 2/2 correct trials on two consecutive weeks. The order
of presentation of each transition test with each relation was
randomised.
Although the trained infants could pass both transition tests at
the onset of testing^ they were continued to be given these tests in




The infants attention in each tracking condition was scored as
follows.
<^ne point was given if the infant watched the object move behind/
onto/through the screen/platform/tunnel on a given trial. When only
one 'occluder' wa3 involved (S^) the infant could score a total of 4
points. In the 3ub-condition where two occluders were used, the
infants' attention in respect of each occluder was separately analysed
(D^ and I>2)• Again 1 point was given for each displacement of the
object relative to the occluder that was watched. Within this sub-
condition a possible score of 4 was obtainable for and D^.
A four way analysis of variance was performed upon the infants'
attention scores. This analysis tested the effect of the following on
attention
(1) Condition: Platform, Screen, Tunnel
(2) : Single 'occluder* first and second of the two
occluders used.in the sub-condition.
(3) Training: Previous experience in the tracking tasks v
no previous experience
(4) Session: The effect of time (and therefore practice)
on the infants' attention.
The results of this analysis are summarised in Table 5*2.
Understanding of the relations 'in' and 'behind* was argued to be
demonstrated if the infant consistently anticipated the emergence of
the object from behind the screen or inside the tunnel. \n anticipatory
response was defined a.3 one in which the infants' eyes were over at
tr
the exit point of the latter prior to the emergence of the object or
within 15 m/sec of its leading edge emerging.
Understanding of the relation 'on' was argued to be demonstrated
if the infant smoothly tracked the object over the surface 0f the
platform.
In each condition^on each trial^ the infant was given one point
if he demonstrated understanding of the relation involved. The
infants' scores in each group were pooled and expressed as a proportion
of the total score that the infants could potentially obtain.
A four way analysis of variance was then performed upon these
scores in an identical fashion to that performed upon the infants'
attention scores.
The results of this analysis are summarised in Table 5s3.
Peaching Analysis
A successful response in the Stage III-IV and IV-V transition
tests was defined in the same manner to that used in Experiments IV, V.
For each Stage IV-V test successfully completed the infant was
given 4 points: one for each of the first two successful recoveries of
the object and two points for successful completion of the catch trial.
For each relation the infant could thus score 8 points in the Stage
IV-V transition test.
TABLE 5:2 4 Way Analysis of Variance: Attention Data





condition(i) 2426.462 2 1213.231 imkl
1213.231
50.65196 23.95 .01
S/\/\ (m) 1038.907 2 519.4536 imkl
519.4536
imkl 10.26 .01
training (k) 592.676 1 592.6758 imkl
592.6758
imkl 11.70 .01
Sessions (l) 3447-934 5 689.5867 imkl
6«9.5867
imkl 13.61 .01
im 1353.924 4 338.4810 imkl
338.4810
imkl 6.68 .01
lit 475.3528 2 237.6764 imkl
237.6764
imkl 4.69 .05
mk 308.4624 2 154.2312 imkl
154.2312
imkl 3.05 NS
il 989.3040 10 98.93039 imkl
98.93039
imkl 1.95 NS
ml 457.8616 10 45.78615 imkl
45.78615
imkl <1.00 NS
kl 480.6008 5 96.12016 imkl
96.12016
imkl 1.90 NS
imk 121.5872 4 30.39679 imkl
30.39679
imkl <1.00 NS
ihl 755.2690 20 37-76344 IMKL
37-76344
IMKL <1.00 NS
ikl 1458.859 10 145.8859 imkl
145-8859
imkl 2.88 .05
mkl 460.7463 10 46.07463 IMKL
46.07463
IMKL < 1.00 NS
imkl 1013.039 20 50.65196 imkl











Condition(l) 172C.907 2 860.4536 IMKL
860.4536
85.65314 10.05 .01
S/Dj/DJ (M) 1076.129 2 538.0647 IMKL
538.0647
IMKL 6.28 .01
Training (K) 3289.037 1 3289.037 IMEL
3289.037
IMKL 38.40 .01
Session (L) 3620.851 5 '174.1702 IMEL
724.1702
IMEL 8.45 .01
5 IM 910.0359 4 227.5090 IMKL
227.509
IKKL ■ 2.66 NS
IE 46.34888 2 23.17444 IMEL
23.17444
IMKL <1.00 NS
mk 38.45874 2 19.22937 IMKL
19.22937
IMKL <1.00 NS
IL 866.3054 10 86.63054 IMKL
86.63054
IMKL 1.01 NS
ML 937.7507 10 93.77507 IMKL
93.77507
IMKL 1.10 NS
EL 646.2820 5 129.2564 IMKL
129.2564
IEEL 1.51 NS
IMK 1383.811 4 345.9526 IMEL
345-9526
IMKL 4.04 .05
IML 3268.698 20 163.4349 II,EL
163.4349
IMKL 1.90 NS
IKL 2153.318 10 215.3318 IMKL
215.3318
IMKL 2.51 .05
MEL 1750.541 10 175.054 IMKL
175.054
ILEL 2.04 NS
IML 1713.063 20 85.65314
1
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TABLE 5'4 Factors affecting attention contrasted with those
affecting anticipation .
Attention Anticipation
Conditions ( <* » .01) Conditions ( oc = .01)
Single ML/D2 ( oc - .01) Si/DI/D2 ( - .01)
Factors Training ( o* = .01) Training ( oi. = ,01)
Session ( o< « .01) Session ( oi » .01)
2 way Cond/SiDiI)2 ( * • *<Xl) Cond/SiDiD? ( 1=2 +66 )(N.S.
interactions
Cond/Training (* *•*09) Cond/Train (f = <1.00)
3 way Cond/31D1I)2/r rain(F < 1.00) Cond/S.D-Dg/TrainC<* - .05)
interactions Con/Train/3ession(<< = .05) Cond/Train/Session(o^ = .05)
The effect of the single factors on attention and anticipation is
illustrated in graph form in Appendix B. As these factors interact
with each other their effects cannot be cpnsidered in isolation.
Graphs 5*1 and 5*2 demonstrate the effect of Condition by and
Condition by Training interactions on attention and anticipation.
































Although no simple linear correlation between attention and anticipation
is observed, the form of the attention curve fc^ars a strong resemblance
to that of the anticipation curve in each condition.


















With the exception of the Platform condition, the trained group were
THAIneb UN-ntAineo TRAinCD UNTrtAiflED
less attentive than the naive or untrained group. In each condition
however the performance of the trained group wa3 superior to that of
the untrained.
The relationship between attention and anticipation shown in these
graphs is however complicated by the fact that 3-way interactions were
also observed in this study.
The effect of Condition and on the subject's behaviour is
observed to interact with the effect of training. This 3 way
interaction is only observed to have an effect on the subject's antici¬
patory behaviour. It did not affect their attention.
Similarly,the effect of Condition and Training on the subjects'
behaviour is observed to interact with the effect of Session. This 3-
way interaction affected the subjects' anticipations and attention.
These 3 way interactions are demonstrated in Graphs 5s3 and 5:4
respectively.
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The interaction Condition/Session/Training complicates the
suggested relationship "between attention and tracking performance.
The latter does not simply deteriorate as the former declines.
However, no strong overall trend towards improved tracking
performance is observed during this longitudinal study. The infants'
tracking performance at the end of this study is still poor relative
to that shown by younger infants at around 5 months of age. This
fact suggests that the relative 'decline' in tracking performance as
a function of age is due to motivational factors rather than competence
changes.
Further as the development of an understanding of the relations
'in', 'on' and 'behind' was found to be roughly synchronous (Wishart
and Bower), if the infants' tracking performance declined as a function
of competence change then this decline and eventual recovery would
1H-
again be expected to be roughly synchronous across the relations being
tested. However tracking performance in this study is found to vary,
as does attention, with the type of relation under study.
Relation of performance in tracking tasks to performance in reaching
tasks
Finally, if we consider the relation between the infants'
performance in the tracking as compared to the reaching tasks it is
observed that the two b are little relation to each other.
In the naive group of infants studied in this experiment, none
could cope with the Stage IV-V transition task with screens and cups
at the onset of this study. Ten of the twelve infants could cope
with the Stage IV-V transition test with platforms. By forty-two
weeks of age, all of the infants could cope with the Stage IV-V
transition test with cups, screens and platforms. Graph 5*6 contrasts
these infants' reaching performance with their tracking performance.
Again if their poor tracking performance was a function of the same
lack of competence that was responsible for their failure in the
reaching tasks, tracking and reaching performance would be expected to
be correlated and to improve over the testing sessions. As can be
seen from Graphs 5*6 this predicted correlation was not observed.
Further while reaching performance was observed to improve to perfection
during the longitudinal study the same is not true of tracking
performance. The reaching profiles observed in this study are
interesting. Performance in the Stage IV-V transition task with
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The reaching profiles for the latter two tasks are observed to be
similar. Such a finding was also observed in Experiment IV.
The trained group of infants had demonstrated their competence
in the Stage Ill-TV and IV-V reaching tasks prior to the onset of this
study. "Ms competence was maintained. In the 288 Stage IV—V
transition tasks with cups these infants made a total of only 4
classical MB errors, in 288 tests with screens a total of 3 A\B errors
were made and in the 2PP trials with the platforms only 4 classical
AAB errors were made. By contrast the infants' performance in the
tracking tasks remained poor during the period of study.
Conclusion
Ml the above observations would thus suggest that the poor
tracking performance observed in experiment V, VI and in ishart and
Bower's study by infants of around 6 months of age and in the above
study is a function of changes in the infants' motivation towards the
task at hand.
5.7. Mvrr
By far the most important study reported in this chapter in its
implications for this thesis is that done by ishart and Bower. Their
study provided evidence that the spatial relation 'behind' would
appear to present as much of a problem to +he infant from sixteen weeks
onwards as the relations 'in' and 'on'.
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The proposed model of the development of the rbject Concept would
appear unable to account for this finding. The spatial relation
'behind' does not generally involve the sharing of spatial boundaries,
spatial position between objects. Perhaps, however, the word
z *
generally is crucial. There is a case when an object behind another
object involves the sharing of a spatial boundary (FICURP 5S4).
V
Here , as "THe distance ©3 • Heae, me distance ©3-
sepeeATioN ap oBJccr ayvd seter-Ation is zefto + ,
SoRtOJ is Ztme> , ntey ttHi? . is tmis mo ^AAein&
saftftt- A ccmon souwoAfty . 0F ^c^crr .
This case would appear however to be of purely academic interest as
in r=aching and tracking tasks designed to assess the infant's
/ \
understanding of the relation behind the object is generally placed
at a couple of inches from the screen. (Few studies, including my
own, specifically quantify and report this distance. Table 5*
reports the estimated distances of separation used in this thesis).
11 %
TABLE 5s8.
Task Distance of Separation
STAGE 1II+V REACHING TASKS (Exp.III-IV) 2 inches
EXPERIMENT V (TRACKING) 1-jg- inches
EXPERIMENT VI . (TRACKING) j>/l inch
It could however be the case that the distance of separation between
the object and the screen is crucial. One last way of explaining the
infant's difficulty with the relation 'behind' within the model of
the development of the Object Concept proposed in this thesis is to
argue that when the distance between the object and the screen i3 small
(value 0L yet to be determined) then the object and the screen are seen
as sharing the same boundary/position in space. This, as I have
already argued is a violation of the infant's rules of object identity.
The same argument would predict that the relation'in front of' would
also be a problem to the infant if the distance of separation of the
object from the screen was 0 —6^ ins. Experimental was designed to
evaluate the above hypothesis.
5.5. TIXPERIWENT VlM
Subjects;
12 infants aged from 22 to 30 weeks of age served as subjects.
Mean age was 25•3 weeks.
Apparatus;
A cardboard screen 6 ins x 7 ins.
3
A bright red cubic toy with a ball in it of dimensions 2 ins x l£
ins x l& ins.
Procedure
A reaching task rather than a tracking task was used to evaluate
the hypothesis mainly because of the lesser time required to run the
former.
The infant was given several warm-up trials in which he had to
reach for the object and the screen at various positions on the table
top. The infants' maximum reaching distance was observed to be
roughly 8 inches.
The infant's understanding of the relations 'in front of' and
•behind' was then evaluated under two conditions. With respect to
each relation the object was either placed against the screen or at a
distance of 3" from it. 3" was the maximum distance of separation
that could be used given the length of the infant's arm 9 inches)
and awkwardness of reach - the object had to be at least 5" from the
infant or he would tend to overshoot his reach. It thus had to be
assumed that a distance of separation between object and screen equal
to 3" was outwith the postulated critical distance 0 - ins.
Within each of these conditions the object was moved behind/in
front of a stationary screen or the latter was moved with respect to a
stationary object. Table 5s9 summarises the design of the study.
One run through this design constituted eight trials. Testing
consisted of three blocks of eight trials each whenever possible.
Within each block of trials order of presentation of the conditions was
counterbalanced.
1 ft
The testing session was video-filmed for subsequent analysis.
TABLE! 5s 9
Condition Relation Distance of
Separation
Trial^ Trial2
















As there was no perceptible distance between the object and the
screen in conditions B and C it is predicted that the infant would have
difficulty reaching for and obtaining the object in these conditions.
He would either refuse to reach or reach for the object and the screen
as a whole.
In conditions A and I) given that there was 3" of separation
between the object and the screen t; e object would be clearly
individualised to the infant. He thus would have no difficulty in
reaching for and obtaining the object in these two conditions.
Thus the proportion of successful reaches observed in Condition A
would equal that in Condition D and be significantly greater than that









The infant was deemed to have been successful in reaching for the
object if he picked it up within 10 seconds of it being placed in front
of the screen.
When the object was placed behind the screen the infant was
allowed 30 seconds in which to reach for the screen. For his reach
for the object to be scored as a success he had to reach for the
latter within 10 seconds of removing the screen.
Results
Table *5s 10 summarises the number of times the infant successfully




condition(j) CONDITION condition condition








(I) A b C d
1 6 6 1 4
2 6 6 1 2
3 6 5 2 2
4 6 3 2 3
5 6 6 3 3
6 4 5 1 2
7 6 6 4 4
8 6 6 3 4
9 6 5 1 1
10 6 6 6 6
11 6 1 2 1
12 5 6 4 3
Mean Score 5.75 5.08 2.5 2.92
A one-way analysis of variance to test for the effect of condition on
the infants' reaching behaviour was carried out. As T'able 5*11
demonstrates condition had a significant effect (p = .01) on their
reaching behaviour.
ta3le 5:11
Source S.3. df MS Error F ratio F Sign
Conditional) 91.72916 3 30.57639 IJ
30.57639
1 .212733





However, examination of Table 5$10 clearly demonstrates that the main
effect of condition on the infant's reaching behaviour was not that
predicted. The main effect of condition was whether the object was
placed in front of or behind the screen and not the distance of
separation between the object and screen.
However if the infants' scores in the Near Conditions are combined as
in Table 5. IX "the distance of separation between the object and the








1 10 7 + 3 9
2 8 7 + 1 1
3 88 7 + 1 1
4 9 5 + 4 16
5 9 9 + 0 0
6 6 6 + 0 0
7 10 10 + 0 0
8 10 9 + 1 1
9 7 6 + 1 1
10 12 12 + 0 0
11 7 3 + 4 16
12 8 10 - 2 4
.~ean Score 8.67 7.59 1.08
49
12
SD2 - 49/l2 - (l.C®)2 = +2.89
t 3 1.08 => 2.12
12 4
-t ol = .05 (one tailed test) df = 11
As obtained t is greater than 1.796
conditions is observed.
t. = 1.796.
a significant difference between
Discussion
The results of Experiment 8 are not as clear-cut, as on« might have
hoped. T'heg do indicate that distance of separation of the object
and the screen does affect the infant's responses but whe+h r the object
is placed in front of or behind the screen is of greater significance.
In xperiment 8 an opaque screen was used. The difference between the
in front of and behind conditions could thus relate to the fact that the
object had disappeared in the latter case. Such an explanation
however seems somewhat out of place in the context of this thesis.
The studies reported in Chapter II indicated that disappearance of the
object is not a major factor in the development of the ^bject Concept.
An alternative explanation of this result would be on=> which
appealed to the limited motor skills of infants of this age.
Independently of the distance of separation between an object and a
screen, an object placed behind a screen poses problems of detour
reaching which do not occur in the case of an object being placed in
front of a screen. If this line of argument is correct it would be
predicted if Experiment 8 was repeated, using both a transparent and an
opaque screen, the main effect of condition would still be whether the
object was placed in front of or behind the screen, independently of
the distance of separation between the object and the screen. By
contrast if it was the disappearance of the object behind the screen
12 5
that posed the major problem for the infant in the behind condition,
the difference between the behind and in front of conditions obtained
in Experiment 8 should disappear leaving the main effect of condition
being the distance of separation between the object and the screen.
Such a study is currently being carried out by de Schonen and
Bower (pers comm). As their study is not totally completed it may be
reported in summary form only. Bower and de Schonen's experimental
set up is illustrated in "'igure 5.5
Figure 5.5
They tested twenty two infants between the ages of five and ten months
of age on their ability to reach for and obtain an object that was
placed either in front of or behind a transparent or an opaque screen.
The object was either positioned against the screen or at a distance
of 10 cms from it.
relirninary results confirm those of Exp eriment 8 • The main
. object position
screen position
Ocreen Pise = 10 x 15 cms
or °0 x 30 cms
Object Bize = 2.5 cms
or 3.5 cms
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effect. of condition on the infant's response was whether the object
W33 placed in front of or behind the 3cresn. This effect was
independent of whether the screen was opaque or transparent. uch a
result supports the argument that the relation behind is more difficult
for the infant than the relation in front of due to the motor skill
requirements of the former. Again the distance of separation between
the object and the screen was found to significantly affect the infant's
response in both the in front of and behind conditions. Again this
effect was not as strong as the effect of these conditions themselves.
In sua then the results of Experiment f and these of de chonen and
bower offer tentative support for the proposal that the infant's
difficulty with the spatial rela+ion 'behind' may be incorporated within
the general explanation of the infant's difficulty with spatial
relationships that is offered in this thesis. The results however
also strongly caution against the attempt to give a complete . icture
of the development of tL4 Object Concept in purely conceptual terms.
The need to integrate the conceptual ahanges involved in this
developmental sequence with the other changes that are also taking
place, such as motor skill changes, is strongly emphasised.
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RPVI1?'. OF T1R JDONTI 'i'T HYCPTOSIS; CONCLUSION:
The results of the experiments reported in this thesis are no+ totally
congruent with the predictions that were made from the pjropo3ed
reinterpretation of the development of the Object Concept. ^he aim of
this Chapter is to examine the significance of these findings for the
identity hypothesis, to see if the latter may be extended to incorporate
all the information we have to date on the development of the Object
Concept and to contrast the success this model has in de-ilin with the
available evidence with that of alternative theoretical frameworks.
traditionally, the development of the "bject Concept is argued to
be primarily about the growth of the infant's ability to represent
objects that are no longer visible. This thesis argued tha4 the
development of the Object Concept should be viewed within a wider
framework than this. Specifically it argued that while the tests used
by Piaget to assess the infant's Object Concept generally involve the
disappearance of an object the infant's x-esponses in such tests were
not simply determined by the fact that the object was no longer visible
but rather by the nature of the transition from "in sight" to "out of
sight". Thus the infant's difficulty in the "tage ITI-V1 Object
Concept tasks was attributed primarily to the type of spatial relation
that existed between object and occluder in these tasks and not solely
to the fact that the object disappeared from sight.
This hypothesis was derived from a consideration of the work of
lower (1967 onwards) on object identity. The infants xules of object
12 8
identity were seen to constrain the set of possible spatial relation¬
ships that could exist between objects without an object losing its own
identity. At around six months of age it was argued that the infant
defined an object in terms of its boundednass, its spatial position,
path of movement and featural characteristics. At this age,
following the work of liower, it was argued that the infant's rules of
object identity forbade the sharing of spatial position or path of
movement and boundaries between objects. However, it is precisely
around this age that testing in the Stage IIJ-VI Object Concept tasks
begin. The na+ure of the transition 'in sight' to 'out of sight'
employed in these tasks involves an object bain* placed inside or
under an occluder. These spatial relations however involve +he sharing
of object boundaries and spatial position. As such it was argued that,
in these tasks, the infant sees the object as being annihilated and
replaced by a new object: the cup or cloth + object. Disappearance
a3 a problem to the infant in the Stage III-VI tasks was not that of
disappearance due to an object disappearing from sight but rather
disappearance due to the loss of the object's identity when it shares
its spatial boundaries with another. Thus of the three variables that
appear to be involved in the Stage JII-V1 Object Concept tasks, namely:
(1) the type of spatial relationship between the Object and
the occluder
(2) perceptuo-motor control of the infant's reaching behaviour
(3) disappearance of the object from the infant's visual field.
Variable I was singled out by this thesis as the central problem facing
the infant in these task3. The characteristic errors made by the
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infant in these tasks were thus argued to reflect strategies developed
by the infant in his attempt to understand the relationship between
object and occluder.
Consequently the core prediction made by this thesis was that the
infant, at Stage III of the development of the Object Concept, would
show similar difficulty to that observed in the Stage 111-VI traditional
Object Concept tasks in dealing with any spatial relationship that
involved the sharing of object boundaries and spatial position irre¬
spective of whether the object objectively disappeared from the infant's
visual field and irrespective of whether the infant's tracking or
reaching behaviour was used to assess his understanding of the rela+ion
in question. Prior to reaching Stage 111 of the developmental
sequence, such rela+ionships would not present any problem to the infant
because of his lower level rules of object identity.
By contrast spatial relationships between objects such as that of
an object being occluded behind another object would present no problem
to the Stage III infant as this relationship does not involve the
sharing of object boundaries and spatial position.
The results of the experiments reported in this thesis contradicted
this core prediction in several important ways.
The primary contradiction come from Experiment III and IV, the
results of which in conjunction with a consideration of the studies
completed by Bower and ishart (1977) and de Schonen and Bower (pers
comm) indicated that the infant had as much difficulty in coping with
the spatial relation 'behind' as he did with the relations 'placed
upon' and 'inside'. Bower and ishart's study is particularly
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important in this respect as it is the only reported study in which the
infant's ability to cope with these relations was studied simultaneously
and longitudinally. Their report that the understanding of these three
relationships between objects developed synchronously strongly implies
that the infant is faced with the same problem in dealing with each
type of relationship. This finding questions the proposed explanation
of the infant's difficult with the relations "placed upon" and "inside"
as the relation "behind" does not involve the sharing of object
boundaries and spatial position. As was indicated in Chapter I, however,
the spatial relation 'behind' could be incorporated within the proposed
explanation of the infant's difficulty with the relations 'inside' and
'placed upon'. This incorporation was dependent upon the distance
between the object and the screen being held as crucial in determining
whether the two were seen as perceptibly separate from each other or
as sharing a common boundary. The two studies which attempted to
evaluate this hypothesis, Experiment VIII and that of de Schonen and
Bower, found some tentative support for it, provided the infant's
response in these studies to this variable was considered in conjunction
with his limited motor skills, a point which will be returned to later.
On the one hand such a hypothesis may be considered a not too
skilfully designed, last, ditch attempt to maintain the original
framework of this thesis. Certaihly it is a hypothesis which warrents
further investigation. There is a need to investigate the effect of
distance of separation between object in screen in tracking studies
which circumvent the problems posed by the limited motor skills of
infants.
Ill
However this hypothesis gains theoretical support from a consider¬
ation of certain other findings of this thesis.
Firstly explanation of the infant's difficulty with the spatial
relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind' in terms of the sharing of boundaries
between objects would lead to the prediction that the type of objects
entering into such relationships would affect the difficulty the infant
had in dealing with them. A ball rather than a cube being placed on
or behind another object would be predicted to provide the infant with
less difficulty as the object boundaries of the ball and the screen
or platform would be barely shared. In Chapter II this was reported
to be the case with the relation 'placed upon'. Bower (1977) has in
fact reported this to be the case for all the spatial relationships
under consideration.
"At any age when spatial relationships are a problem,
they (the Infants) are far more likely to succeed
with a ball than with a cube or a half ball for
example."
(Bower: A Primer of Infant Development
(1977) P.117)
Secondly, with respect to the spatial relation behind, Bower, as was
indicated in Chapter I, has provided a strong case that the infant's
perceptual system innately transduces the optical information
specifying X going behind Y and continuing to exist. This transduction
he argues is a necessary prerequisite for the perception of ti ee
dimensional space. For this argument to be maintained in lijht of the
reported difficulty the infant has with the relation 'behind', the
distance of separation between X and Y has to be seen as crucial.
Thirdly given the studies by Bower and Paterson (197?), ishart and
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Lower (1977) and the results of Experiment 7> any explanation of the
infant's difficulties in the Stage III-VI Object Concept tasks requires
to relate this part of the developmental sequence to the accomplishments
of Stages I-III. As indicated in the opening Chapter to this thesis
none of the alternative theoretical frameworks for explaining the
infant's difficulty in the former tasks do this. Explanation of the
infant's difficulties in the Stage III-VI tasks in terms of the spatial
relationships involved does. 'ithin this explanatory framework the
infant's definition of object identity must be related to featural as
well as positional and movement information about the object (a Stage
III accomplishment.) before the infant can have a basis from which to
resolve the problem posed by the sharing of object boundaries that is
involved in +he spatial relationships 'on' 'in' and 'behind' (the latter
relation, of course, only being a problem under certain circumstances).
Fourthly, Experiments I and II, the studies reported in Chapter II
by Piaget 1937 and Bower and fishart (1976) and fie Schonen and Bower's
study, all demonstrate that the infant experiences difficulty in the
Stage III-VI Object Concept tasks irrespective of whether the object
disappears from sight in such tasks. Stage IV-V errors are observed
if the object is placed in full view on a platform, inside a trans¬
parent container or behind a transparent screen. Such results are
congruent with the proferred thesis that the major difficulty facing
the infant in the Stage III-VI tasks is that of understanding the
spatial relationship between objects that pertain in these tasks. It
is the nature of the transition 'in sight' to 'out cf sight' that is
crucial in the traditional Pia stian Stage III-VI tasks and not the
disappearance of the object peS> se.
iyy
Thu3 while the evidence to date cannot be said to provide
conclusive support for the proposed reinterpretation of what the
development of the Object Concept is about and the deilved explanation
of the infant's difficulty with the Stage III—VI tasks in terms of
the spatial relationships between objects that pertain in these tasks,
the weight of the evidence would appear to favour this hypothesis over
the traditional interpretation of this developmental sequence as being
primarily about the infant's developing ability to conserve the
existence of an object that is no longer visible.
This reinterpretation of the development of the Object Concept may
be seen as splitting the developmental sequence into two distinct
periods.
Period I (Stage l-Ill). development of rules of object identity
that incorporate featural positional and movement information about the
object.
Period II (Stage TJI-,,l). Development of rales of object identity
that, extend, those of period I to incorporate relationships between
objects that involve the sharing of object boundaries.
There however remain some problems with this proposal. The primary
one is that during Period II of the developmental sequence the
development of successful eye movement strategies to deal with the
relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind' generally precedes successful manual
search strategies ( undy-Castle and Anglin 19&9? Bower and Paterson
1973? Bower, Broughton and I/oore 1971 and Bower and ishart 1977) •
At first glance this finding of discontinuity or repetition in the
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development of the infant'a understanding of spatial relationships
would appear to favour extending the spatial relationship explanation
of the infant's difficulty in the traditional Stage I1I-VT reaching
tasks to incorporate some of the features of Bressan and de Schonen's
explanation of this difficulty, which pays greater attention to the
type of response that is used to assess the infant's understanding.
However the fact that practice in developing appropriate qye movement
strategies can favourably affect the development of appropriate
reaching strate. ies, Bower and Paterson{l97^)sometimes to the extent
that development of the latter appears instantaneous once the infant
has the requisite motor capabilities, ('"ishart and Bower 1977)> argues
against this discontinuity being explainable in terms of the response
used to assess the infant's understanding. Hather it suggests that
the discontinuity is to be explained in terms of the conceptual
fi
representation of the infant's understanding of the relationships.
While practice in tracking tasks designed to test the infant's
understanding of spatial relationships can and does improve performance
in the reaching tasks, the relationship between the two is inverse.
A little practice with the tracking tasks facilitates performance on
manual search tasks a great deal more than does a lot of practice. The
question is why.
* The assumption in this discussion is that had the infants in Wiahart
and Bower's study been given all the Stage III-VI reaching tasks
they would have had no difficulty with any of the tasks. In reality
the infants were only given the Stage 11I-V tasks.
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Bower (1976) has proposed the following model to explain these
results,
"The model we are using is based on data about
short term perceptual development. Consider a
simple experiment on habituation. If we show a
baby a cube in a constant orientation ten times
for 30 seconds each time, the baby will look at
the cube progressively less and less. This
indicates that the baby recognises that he is seeing
the same object each time and is, naturally, less
and less interested in it. Suppose we show the baby
a cube ten times, in a different orientation each
time. e get exactly the 3ame decline in looking
(Day & McKenzie 1973). Consider what this tells
us about the way a baby remembers objects. The
baby obviously cannot have a very specific image
of a cube-in-a-orientation because every presentation
is different in respect of orientation. He must
remember that there is a cube out there, without
remembering the orientation of the cube. This kind
of memory is really rather abstract. It must be
almost as abstract as a word is. It also lacks
detail, even detail about some-* bing as important as
orientation (see also Bower 1966). nonetheless given
time a baby can work up a very specific internal
description of an object so that even very slight
changes will arrest the decline in looking behaviour.
In short term perceptual learning the baby's internal
description of an object thus goes from rather
abstract to very specific.
!S/q would like to propose a similar kind of process
in conceptual development, with the baby or infant
progressively elaborating his description of events
to make them more specific, thereby changing the
likelihood of smooth transfer from one skill to another,
and thereby increasing the likelihood of a seeming
repetition." (CONCEPTS OP DEVELOPMENT, BOWER 1976)®
As applied to the problem of the development of the Object Concept
thi3 latter statement implies that in a tracking task in which an
object moves 'behind' 'in' 'on' another object the infant first of all
learns to co-ordinate his place and movement rules of object identity,
to use featural information in defining the identity of an object.
Once the infant recognises that the object which 'dis ippears' 'behind'
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'onto' 'In' -the screen, platform, tunnel Is the same as that which
reappears on the other side of the track- he has to work out what has
happened to It when it 'disappears' i.e. development an understanding
of the relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind', realise that two objects may
share common boundaries without losing their individual identity.
This understanding need not generate particularly accurate tracking as
the infant has not yet articulated the precise spatio-temporal parameters
of the task in hand. It will, however, enable him to transfer this
understanding to th» reaching tasks given the common principle on which
both tasks are based. If however the infant is given increasing
practice in the tracking tasks his tracking will improve in so far as
he will work out specific sensor!-motor rules that articulate the
particular spatio-temporal nature of the tracking t.a3k such as
"to see the object which has vanished on the left
hand side of the tunnel, look for it at. the right
hand side after X seconds" (from Lower 1976)t
Such increased specification of his understanding of the tracking
tasks inhibits transfer of learning from these tasks to the reaching
tasks. k rule of the above type is clearly not applicable to the
reaching task and thus the infant, when faced with the reaching tasks
appears to have to relearn an understanding of the relations 'in' 'on'
and 'behind'. He has to dredge the general principle that two objects
can be in the same place at the same time from his memory in order to
successfully cope with the reaching tasks. The fact that the infant
can, given appropriate environmental input, generalise his understanding
of the relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind' from a tracking task to a
reaching task has important implications for alternative theories of
IJ7
the nature of the problem facing the infant in these latter tasks.
Bresson and de ochonen's explanation of the infant's difficulty
in the latter tasks is a purely percaptuo-motor one. It cannot
possibly account for such perfect transfer of competence from a
tracking ta3k to the reaching task3.
Butterworth's (1975) explanation of the infant's difficulty in the
reaching tasks in terms of conflict between egocentric and relative
codings of object position is centred on the fact that in the traditional
Stage IV-V reaching task the object is displaced relative to two other
objects in the visual field. However in the tracking tasks the object
is displaced relative to only one other object yet the infant's
understanding of this situation is sufficient to enable him to cope
perfectly with the Stage IV-V reaching task. Such transfer of
understanding suggests that the problem facing the infant in the latter
task is not specific to two 'occluders' being present in the infant's
visual field. A similar criticism applies to Paacual-Leona's model
of the Object Concept.
However unless given the appropriate environmental input the infant
would appear to have to relea in the Stage 111-VI reaching tasks
that objects continue to exist as independent entities even when they
share spatial boundaries. In Chapter I it was argued that the initial
stage in this development was when the infant became aware of the
conflict between his initial reaction to the sharing of object boundaries -
namely that the object had been suddenly and mysteriously replaced by
another object - and his recognition that the object which reappeared
when he hit the platform, screen, cup was the same as that which had
IJQ
been mysteriously annihilated. The infant was thus seen to enter the
Stage IV-V reaching task with a magical understanding of the relationship
between his action on the platform, screen, cup and the reappearance
of the object. This magical understanding was argued to take the form
of a contingent rule of the type. "Contact replacement object to
retrieve original object." The problem facing the infant in the
Stage IV-V task was argued to be the fact that two objects competed
for the title of replacement object. In Chapter I it was argued that
choice between the replacement objects was based on their respective
positions. It however is equally possible to argue that the infant's
choice between the set of two possible replacement objects is determined
by response persevation. As such, it should be obvious that the
restatement of what the problem is to the infant, in the later stages
of the development of the Object Concept does not in any way resolve
the controversy, described in Chapter I, about the strategies used by
the infant in attempting to solve the Stage IV-V reaching tasks.
$hese strategies however are seen to derive from a lack of understanding
of the spatial relationships between objects and not from a lack of
understanding that objects continue to exist.when no longer visible.
Further comparison of the type of strategies employed by the infant
in tracking as opposed to reaching studies of his understanding of the
relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind' might provide information about how
motor skill limitations constrain the type of strategy employed.
This explana+ion of the relationship between successful eye
tracking strategies and reaching strategies in development through
period II of the Object Concept also has implications for how this
development is conceptualised. Bower's model suggests that development
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of understanding of a given event proceeds from a rather abstract
conceptual form to a more specific description that is closely related
to the type of responses being used to assess understanding. While
this proposal is congruent with the assumptions underlying the proposed
reinterpretation of the development of the Object Concept, i€ is in direct
contradiction to Piaget's classical description of the processes
underlying the development of the Object Concept. This latter
description sees the infant's understanding of objects as being an
integral, and not separate, feature of the type of actions he brings to
teear on objects. Only through progressive differentiation of such
action schemas does the infant come to form a more abstract and therefore
more conceptual understanding of objects. S'ishart and Power's study,
reported in Chapter V, would appear to favour dower's model of the
process of conceptual development over the ' iagetian one. Elore studies
on the relationship between training tasks and generalisation from
these task3 to other tasks is required before the evidence can be said
to be conclusive one way or another.
Finally if development through the latter stages of the Object Concept
is development of the infant's understanding of the spatial relationships
that exist between objects, what factors are important in it?
With respect to the traditional Stage III-VI reaching tasks it is
obvious that if the infant's understanding of the relations 'in' 'on*
and 'behind' are to be tested in this format, a certain degree of motor
skill is required. As was indicated in experiment 8 and in the
Ccbonen and Bower's study motor skill limitations differentially affect
the degree of difficulty the infant has with the relations in front of
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and behind even if the conceptual problem of each relation is identical.
Reaching round an obstacle and removing an obstacle for another
present motor skill difficulties to the infant (Bruner 1968). The
motor skill requirements of the Stage III-V transition tests with
platforms are less than those for such tasks with screens or cups or
cloths. Such a difference may contribute to the fact that the
relation 'placed upon' appears an 'easier' relation for the infant to
understand in that test context while there is no difference in the
'ease' with which the infant develops an understanding of these three
relations in tracking studies where the "motor requirements" for
demonstrating understanding of each relation are equal (Wishart and
Bower). With respect to these five month old infants who directly
transferred their understanding of this set of spatial relations from a
tracking to a reaching task one can only presume that their conceptual
understanding of the task in hand was such that it freed their processing
capacities to concentrate solely on the appropriate motor action plans
for the task in hand.
However it must also be noted in this discussion of motor skill and
the development of the Object Concept that reaching experiences of
themselves are not essential for the development of an understanding of
spatial relationships as Wishart and Bower's study and Gouin Becarie's
(1965) study of the development of the Object Concept in thalidaraide
children clearly indicate.
Understanding of the relations 'in' 'on' and 'behind* does not
appear to be capable of being developed from the simple read-off of
perceptual information, for as Experiment I demonstrated extensive
practice with objects "hidden" inside transparent containers did not
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lead to an understanding of the relation inside but rather to the
formation of a contingent rule that was sufficient for success in the
Stage I1I-V task with transparent containers but failed to generalise,
as understanding of the principle involved in the task would have
done, to testing involving an object hidden inside an opaque container.
Certainly, however, perceptual development in itself would appear to
be an important factor in the understanding of these relationships.
Increase in the processing capacity of the infant's perceptual system
would appear to be a necessary condition for the infant to be able to
analyse featural information about an object. The use of featural
information is seen as an essential step in the co-ordination of the
infant's place and movement rules of object identity. Likewise
increase in the infant's memory capacity allows for greater description
of the characteristics of an object. On the other hand, the limitations
of the infant's perceptual system are seen to be related to the
degree of difficulty the infant has in dealing with the spatial relation
'behind *.
The fact that the infant's understanding of the spatial relations
•in' 'on' and 'behind' cannot be read off from perceptual input favours
a constructivist model of the nature of conceptual development. It
suggests that development of an understanding of the relations 'in* 'on*
and 'behind* comes from conflict between two alternative modes of
comprehension of a given event. The suggestion in Chapter I, a
suggestion maintained through this thesis, is that the initial
propelling conflict for getting the infant off the ground in the later
Stages of the Object Concept is conflict between his initial reaction
to an obj4ct sharing its boundaries with another object namely that the
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object has been annihilated and his reaction to the reappearance of
the object, namely that it still exists.
In conclusion then, while this thesis cannot be said to provide
conclusive evidence for the proposal that development through the later
stages of the Object Concept is development of the infant's under¬
standing of spatial relationships between objects that involve the
sharing of object boundaries, it is argued that this proposal, to date
provides the most comprehensive picture of what the development of the
Object Concept is about.
1 i>
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